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NOTHING PERSONAL (OR SUBJECT MATTER) ABOUT IT:
JURISDICTIONAL RISK AS AN IMPETUS FOR NONTRIBAL OPT-OUTS FROM TRIBAL ECONOMIES, AND THE
NEED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSE
Joel Pruett *
I. Introduction
Tribal civil jurisdiction, as it pertains to non-tribal investors, is too
complicated. 1 The current scheme, which has been called an “unstable
jurisdictional crazy quilt” 2 and a “procedural and jurisdictional
nightmare,” 3 damages tribal economies and frustrates Congress’s “twin
goals of [tribal] economic self-sufficiency and political selfdetermination.” 4 Indeed, not only is the canon of tribal civil jurisdiction
filled with incoherence 5 and judicial “equivocat[ion],” 6 but the tribal
exhaustion doctrine 7 also imposes on potential non-tribal litigants the threat
of expending substantial “time, money and effort litigating . . . in . . . Tribal
* J.D./M.B.A. candidate, University of Oklahoma, 2016; B.S., Kansas State
University, 2011. I would like to extend thanks to Professor Erin Means, my faculty advisor,
for her guidance and comments on my research and writing.
1. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 376 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that
tribal courts’ civil jurisdiction with respect to non-Indians is “‘ill-defined,’ since this Court’s
own pronouncements . . . have pointed in seemingly opposite directions”) (citation omitted).
2. Id. at 383 (Souter, J., concurring).
3. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 853 (1985)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
4. 25 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(12) (2012).
5. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 659 (Souter, J., concurring)
(indicating that the canon is “coherent” only if it follows Montana).
6. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 387 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
7. The doctrine of tribal exhaustion requires that a litigant seeking to challenge an
exercise of tribal civil jurisdiction generally must first exhaust his remedies in tribal court.
See Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985); Iowa
Mutual, 480 U.S. at 16-17. After exhausting tribal remedies, litigants may seek subsequent
review of the tribal court’s civil jurisdiction in federal or state court. See, e.g., Nat’l Farmers,
471 U.S. at 847-48, 857; Red Fox v. Hettich, 494 N.W.2d 638, 640-41, 647 (S.D. 1993)
(declining to enforce a tribal court judgment for tribal party’s failure to “clearly and
convincingly [show] that the tribal court had jurisdiction” over a non-tribal party). For
exhaustive coverage of the doctrine, see generally Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation,
Construction and Application of Federal Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine, 186 A.L.R. Fed. 71
(2003).
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Court” before “seeking to terminate the tribal court actions against them” in
federal court. 8 Throughout this paper, the combination of uncertainty in the
law of tribal jurisdiction and the significant cost of litigating in both tribal
and federal (or state) court to resolve case-by-case jurisdictional questions
will be referred to as “Jurisdictional Risk.”
The confusion of the legal doctrine and concomitant uncertainty arises
from the fact that civil jurisdiction in tribal courts is built on a scheme
vastly different from that used by state and federal courts. Tribal civil
jurisdiction considers the parties’ tribal affiliations, 9 whether the suitinducing transaction or occurrence took place on Indian-owned land, 10 and
whether the land was located on an Indian reservation. 11 Furthermore, the
canon of tribal civil jurisdiction takes into account considerations of federal
policy and tribal sovereignty 12 and any intervening federal statutes, 13 just to
name a few of the differences among the many additional idiosyncratic,
case-specific considerations in establishing tribal civil jurisdiction.
Non-tribal parties seeking to enter commercial relationships with the
tribes are thus faced with a great deal of uncertainty and a heavy burden of
costly, time-consuming, and less-than-fool-proof due diligence. 14 The
significant number of factual permutations inherent to analyzing tribal civil
jurisdiction requires an untangling of numerous case law nuances and case8. See, e.g., Koniag, Inc. v. Kanam, No. 3:12–cv–00077–SLG, 2012 WL 2576210, at
*5 (D. Alaska 2012). See also Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C. v. Stidham, 640 F.3d 1140, 1157
(10th Cir. 2011) (“Crowe faces a significant risk of financial injury” because “there is a
significant risk that Crowe will be forced to expend unnecessary time, money, and effort
litigating . . . in the Muscogee Nation District Court—a court which likely does not have
jurisdiction over it.”) (quoting Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C. v. Stidham, 609 F.Supp.2d 1211,
1222 (N.D. Okla. 2009)), aff’d 640 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
9. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (articulating “the general
proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the
activities of nonmembers of the tribe”).
10. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001) (“The ownership status of land . . . is
only one factor to consider . . . . It may sometimes be a dispositive factor.”).
11. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (“The cases in this Court have
consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their reservations.”).
12. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 449 (1997).
13. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 220 (“[A]bsent governing Acts of Congress, the question
has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to
make their own laws and be ruled by them.”).
14. See, e.g., ROBERT E. HOSKISSON ET AL., COMPETING FOR ADVANTAGE 252 (Jack W.
Calhoun et al. eds., 2d ed. 2008) (discussing added costs of faulty due diligence in the
acquisition context).
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specific determinations of racial identity and land ownership. Although
federal court precedent has demonstrated a consistent commitment to
supporting tribal justice as part of a tribe’s “inherent sovereign powers,” 15
the vagaries and inconsistent application of tribal civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians leave non-tribal providers of debt and equity capital
(hereinafter “Investors”) uncertain of the court systems to which they have
potentially subjected themselves. In fact, theories of financial economics
and business strategy, a study on reservation economics, and recent
Supreme Court precedent indicate that many Investors may simply forgo
the Jurisdictional Risk of tribal investment by investing elsewhere. 16
Existing solutions to the problem—lawsuits challenging tribal
jurisdiction and careful contract drafting—are fraught with their own
uncertainties and risks, making them unsuitable for mitigating Jurisdictional
Risk and corresponding damage to tribal economies. 17 Therefore, given the
apparent relationship between uncertainty in tribal civil jurisdiction and
decreased non-tribal investment, in contradiction to the federal policy of
“[tribal] economic self-sufficiency,” 18 Congress should break its long
silence on issues of tribal civil jurisdiction. 19 Legislative action, ideally by
administrative delegation, would provide additional guidance for courts and
reduce uncertainty for Investors so as to encourage economic development
on tribal reservations. 20
This comment will begin to explore the relationship between tribal civil
jurisdiction and tribal economic development by providing background
information in Part II, which reviews federal policy on tribal sovereignty
and economics, as well as early case law underlying the modern canon of
tribal civil jurisdiction. Part III analyzes the doctrinal problems, beginning
with a review of uncertainties and judicial schisms in the doctrine;
proceeding to a review of anecdotal evidence that strongly suggests a link
between uncertainty in the law of tribal civil jurisdiction and alleged
transactional discrimination; and concluding with a financial economicsbased review of Investor incentives. Part IV offers solutions, beginning
with two reactive coping strategies for parties subject to the current
jurisdictional doctrine: suits to challenge tribal jurisdiction and contract
15. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
16. See infra Section III.C.
17. See infra Section IV.A.-B.
18. 25 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(12) (2012).
19. See Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851
(1985) (“[T]he power of the Federal Government over the Indian tribes is plenary.”).
20. See infra Section IV.D.
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drafting to reduce risk. Part IV concludes with proactive, long-term
legislative and administrative approaches to rebalancing Congress’s “twin
goals of [tribal] economic self-sufficiency and political self-determination”
in the context of tribal jurisdiction. 21
II. Background
A. Federal Policy on Tribal Sovereignty22 and Economics
No longer fully sovereign, 23 Indian tribes are subject to federal “plenary”
authority, thogh vestiges of their earlier “inherent” sovereignty remain. 24
Contrary early policies of tribal assimilation notwithstanding, 25 modern
federal policies value “tribal self-government and self-determination.” 26
The Supreme Court, in Montana v. United States, explained that
“through their original incorporation into the United States as well as
through specific treaties and statutes, the Indian tribes have lost many of the
attributes of sovereignty,” particularly with respect to “relations between an
Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe.” 27 This is so because “the
dependent status of Indian tribes within [United States] territorial
jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent with their freedom independently to
determine their external relations.” 28
Federal statutes also illuminate modern policy at the intersection of tribal
economics and sovereignty. Congress has articulated generalized support
for tribal “political self-determination,” 29 especially with respect to “tribal
government involvement in and commitment to improving tribal justice

21. 25 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(12).
22. Although an exhaustive review of tribal sovereignty is beyond the scope of this
paper, for a recent, generalized treatment of the subject matter, see Alex Tallchief Skibine,
Constitutionalism, Federal Common Law, and the Inherent Powers of Indian Tribes, 39 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 77 (2014-2015).
23. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563 (1981).
24. Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 851.
25. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220-21 (1959) (identifying a congressional
policy intending the “full-fledged” assimilation of tribes, with the eventual transfer of all
jurisdictional power to the states once “the educational and economic status of the Indians
permits the change without disadvantage to them”).
26. Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856.
27. Montana, 450 U.S. at 563-64 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326
(1978), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012)) (emphasis omitted).
28. Id. at 564 (citing Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326, superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. §
1301(2)) (emphasis omitted).
29. 25 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(12) (2012).
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systems.” 30 This strong support for tribal judicial sovereignty appears to
sometimes conflict with interests in eliminating discrimination in
transactions between tribal and non-tribal parties and supporting tribal
economic development. This policy conflict is exacerbated by the fact that
Congress has failed to provide courts with any guidance as to how interests
in tribal sovereignty and economics should be balanced, leading the
apolitical courts 31 to develop a noncommittal, unpredictable, and limbo-like
doctrine of tribal civil jurisdiction. 32
Congress, however, implicitly acknowledges a relationship between “the
twin goals of [tribal] economic self-sufficiency and political selfdetermination.” 33 More specific to jurisdictional matters, Congress has also
articulated a goal of “strengthen[ing] tribal governments and . . .
economies. . . through the enhancement and . . . development of tribal court
systems,” 34 demonstrating an interest in continuous development of federal
legislation to achieve this goal. 35
30. 25 U.S.C. § 3601(9) (2012).
31. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(“Judges . . . are not part of either political branch of the Government. Courts must, in some
cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the judges' personal
policy preferences”); cf. DANIEL J. GIFFORD, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
72 (2d ed. 2010) (“In Chevron . . . [i]t was more appropriate, Justice Stevens ruled, for
policy choices to be made by the President—who is responsible to the electorate at the
polls—than for courts—which are not politically responsible—to make those policy
choices”); Marcia R. Gelpe, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Lessons from
Environmental Cases, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 21 (1984) (“Officials within [an
administrative] agency who are not responsive to [political] views risk losing their jobs. . . .
In contrast, judges are appointed for life in some jurisdictions. In other jurisdictions, judges
are elected, but the elections are not designed to make judges politically responsive. Judicial
terms are long, many elections are uncontested, and the issue in contested elections is
usually competence rather than the popularity of decisions. Thus, agencies are more
responsive to the political process than are courts and, therefore, are the more appropriate
body for deciding discretionary, policy-choice issues.”).
32. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 391-92 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (“Montana and our other cases concerning tribal civil
jurisdiction over nonmembers occupy a middle ground between our cases that provide for
nearly absolute tribal sovereignty over tribe members and our rule that tribes have no
inherent criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers.”) (citations omitted).
33. See 25 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(12) (2012) (emphasis added).
34. 25 U.S.C. § 3652(3) (2012); see also 25 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(9)(A)-(B) (requiring the
federal government to “assist Indian tribes with the creation of appropriate economic and
political conditions” that would “encourage investment from outside sources” and “facilitate
economic ventures with outside entities”).
35. 25 U.S.C. § 3652(5).
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More generalized economic policies call upon the federal government to
enhance tribal access to “resources of the private market,” “adequate
capital,” and “technical expertise.” 36 Indeed, Congress has indicated that
the federal government itself should “provide capital . . . to help develop
and utilize Indian resources . . . to a point where the Indians will fully
exercise responsibility for the utilization and management of their own
resources and where they will enjoy a standard of living . . . comparable to
that enjoyed by non-Indians.” 37
Perhaps animating these economic policies is a congressional finding
that “the capacity of Indian tribes to build strong tribal governments and
vigorous economies is hindered by the[ir] inability . . . to engage
[surrounding] communities . . . and outside investors in economic
activities.” 38 This effect may contribute to the fact that “Native Americans
suffer higher rates of unemployment, poverty, poor health, substandard
housing, and associated social ills than those of any other group in the
United States.” 39
B. Foundational Case Law
Although the nuanced doctrine of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonIndians remains difficult to apply in fact-specific situations, some
underlying principles have crystallized. As a general matter, tribes may not
exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, except as provided by statutes
or treaties. 40 Pursuant to Montana v. United States, 41 however, tribal courts
may exercise “inherent” 42 tribal civil jurisdiction over non-tribal entities
36. See 25 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(12)(A)-(C).
37. 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (2012).
38. 25 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(7).
39. Id. § 4301(a)(8).
40. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 449 (1997) (“As the Court made plain
in Montana, the general rule and [its] exceptions there announced govern only in the absence
of a delegation of tribal authority by treaty or statute.”); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.
544, 565 (1981) (articulating a “general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an
Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe”). But see Iowa Mut.
Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (articulating a general rule that tribal civil
jurisdiction over “non-Indians on reservation lands . . . presumptively lies in the tribal courts
unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute”). But see also
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 380 (2001) (“[W]e resisted th[is] overbreadth of the Iowa
Mutual dictum [in Strate].”); Strate, 520 U.S. at 451-52 (“Read in context . . . [the language
of Iowa Mutual] scarcely supports the view that the Montana rule does not bear on tribalcourt adjudicatory authority in cases involving nonmember defendants.”).
41. See infra Section II.B.1 for additional discussion of Montana.
42. See 450 U.S. at 565-66.
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where non-tribal entities enter into commercial relationships with tribal
entities 43 or where a non-tribal entity threatens tribal self-governance. 44
However, the doctrine of tribal exhaustion 45 requires that a litigant
seeking to challenge an exercise of tribal civil jurisdiction generally must
first exhaust his remedies in tribal court 46 as “tribal courts are best qualified
to interpret and apply tribal law.” 47 After exhausting tribal remedies,
litigants may seek subsequent review of the tribal court’s civil jurisdiction
in state48 or federal court. 49
In reviewing the legitimacy of an exercise of tribal civil jurisdiction over
a non-Indian, federal courts have considered multiple factors with varying
degrees of influence. These factors include whether suit-inducing conduct
took place on an Indian reservation, 50 whether the land on which the suit-

43. See id. at 565 (“A tribe may regulate . . . the activities of nonmembers who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements.”).
44. See id. at 566 (“A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority
over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe.”).
45. A complete discussion of the tribal exhaustion doctrine is beyond the scope of this
paper. For exhaustive coverage of the doctrine, see generally Buckman, supra note 7.
46. See Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985)
(indicating that although the issue of tribal civil jurisdiction is a matter of federal law subject
to federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, tribal court “exhaustion is required
before such a claim may be entertained by a federal court”); Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 16-17
(indicating that litigants must also exhaust tribal court remedies before challenging tribal
civil jurisdiction in federal court where the federal challenge is supported by diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332). But see Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856 n.21 (“We do
not suggest that exhaustion would be required where an assertion of tribal jurisdiction ‘is
motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith,’ . . . or where the action is
patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions, or where exhaustion would be futile
because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court’s jurisdiction.”)
(quoting Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338 (1977)).
47. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 16.
48. See, e.g., Red Fox v. Hettich, 494 N.W.2d 638 (S.D. 1993) (declining to enforce a
tribal court judgment for tribal party’s failure to “clearly and convincingly [show] that the
tribal court had jurisdiction” over a non-tribal party ).
49. See Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857 (“Until petitioners have exhausted the remedies
available to them in the Tribal Court system, it would be premature for a federal court to
consider any relief.”) (citation omitted).
50. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (“[T]o allow the exercise of state
jurisdiction here would . . . infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves. It is
immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the transaction
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inducing conduct took place was owned by a tribal party, 51 and whether the
parties were affiliated with the tribe. 52 Federal court review of tribal civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians is also guided by “careful examination of
tribal sovereignty, . . . detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch
policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial
decisions.” 53
1. Montana’s Presumption Against Tribal Court Jurisdiction over NonIndians and Jurisdiction-Enabling Exceptions
In the “pathmarking case” 54 of Montana v. United States, the Supreme
Court articulated the general rule that tribal courts lack jurisdiction over
non-tribal parties, subject to two exceptions that would allow otherwise. 55
The first exception (the “Commercial Relationship Exception”) provides for
tribal regulatory jurisdiction, “through taxation, licensing, or other means,”
over “the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with
the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or
other arrangements.” 56 The second exception (the “Self-Governance
Exception”) provides for the tribes’ “retain[ed] inherent . . . civil authority”
with respect to non-tribal parties on non-tribal land within the reservation
“when [their] conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” 57
The case arose from the question of whether the Crow Tribe of Montana
had the regulatory jurisdiction to ban all non-tribal hunting and fishing on
non-tribal land within the Crow reservation. 58 In the Second Treaty of Fort
Laramie of 1868 between the United States and the Crow Tribe, the Crow

with an Indian took place there. The cases in this Court have consistently guarded the
authority of Indian governments over their reservations.”) (citations omitted).
51. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 387-88 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (“Given the facts of Montana, it was not clear whether the
status of the persons being regulated, or the status of the land where the [suit-inducing
conduct] occurred, led the Court to develop Montana’s jurisdictional rule and its exceptions.
In subsequent cases, we indicated that the nonmember status of the person being regulated
determined Montana’s application, while in other cases we indicated that the fee simple
status of the land triggered application of Montana.”) (citations omitted).
52. See id.
53. Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 855-56.
54. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997).
55. 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
56. Id. at 565.
57. Id. at 566.
58. Id. at 547.
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reservation was “‘set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and
occupation’ of the Crow Tribe,” and it banned all “non-Indians except
agents of the Government [from] . . . ‘pass[ing] over, settl[ing] upon, or
resid[ing] in’ the reservation.” 59 After signing that treaty, however,
Congress passed at least six allotment acts that authorized tribal allottees to
transfer their parcels to non-tribal parties after the conclusion of a twentyfive-year holding period. 60
The Crow Tribe had instituted bans on nonmember hunting and fishing
within their reservation despite the fact that thirty percent of the reservation
land was owned by parties not affiliated with the tribe, that fishing on the
Big Horn River would not be possible but for a federal dam, and that the
state of Montana—which had refused to cede its alleged regulatory
authority—stocked the reservation with fish and game. 61
The United States sued on behalf of the tribe, seeking declaratory
judgment that regulatory jurisdiction over hunting and fishing was reserved
to the Crow Tribe and the federal government. 62 The Supreme Court held
that the Second Treaty of Fort Laramie required the federal government to
bar non-tribal entry to tribal-owned reservation land, which implicitly gave
the tribe regulatory jurisdiction over hunting and fishing only on land
subject to the tribe’s “absolute and undisturbed use and occupation.” 63 This
treaty provision, the Court opined, barred tribal regulatory authority over
“lands held in fee by non-Indians.” 64 Citing Puyallup Tribe v. Washington
Game Department, the Court also explained that “treaty rights with respect
to reservation lands must be read in light of the subsequent alienation of
those lands.” 65
Ultimately, the Court in Montana held that the Crow Tribe could not
regulate hunting and fishing with respect to non-tribal members on nontribal land within the reservation because neither the Commercial
Relationship Exception nor the Self-Governance Exception applied. 66 In
reaching its decision, the Court considered factors of parties’ tribal
affiliations and tribal land ownership, but the analysis is too ambiguous to
indicate “whether the status of the persons being regulated, or the status of
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 548.
Id.
Id. at 548-49.
Id. at 549.
Id. at 558-59 (quoting Treaty with the Crows, May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649).
Id.
Id. at 561 (citing Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977)).
Id. at 566.
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the land . . . led the Court to develop Montana’s jurisdictional rule and its
exceptions.” 67
Thus, although the rationale of the Montana rule is not abundantly clear,
in light of the fact that neither exception applied, the case was governed by
the general rule that tribal courts lack jurisdiction over non-tribal parties. 68
2. Limiting the Jurisdiction-Enabling Montana Exceptions to Mere
Specific Jurisdiction to Preserve Montana’s General Rule Against Tribal
Civil Jurisdiction over Non-Indians
Subsequent cases interpreting Montana have restricted both of its
exceptions to authorize only specific—not general—jurisdiction over nonIndians.
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley indicates that Montana’s Commercial
Relationship Exception merely provides specific regulatory jurisdiction
over non-tribal parties operating on non-tribal land. 69 In that case, a nontribal hotelier questioned the Navajo Nation’s regulatory jurisdiction under
Montana. 70 The Navajo Nation had exercised regulatory authority by
levying a hotel occupancy tax against the hotelier’s guests despite the fact
that his hotel was on non-tribal land within the Navajo reservation. 71 After
exhausting tribal appeals, the hotelier sued in federal court, ultimately
appealing to the Supreme Court. 72 The Court found no regulatory
jurisdiction, holding that the plaintiff did not consent to a hotel occupancy
tax levied against its guests merely by having access to tribal emergency
services or by acquiring “Indian trader” status. 73
The Court reasoned that in order to achieve regulatory jurisdiction the
Navajo tax must share a nexus with a jurisdiction-enabling consensual
relationship. 74 Furthermore, the Court held that tribal parties may not
circumvent the nexus requirement by pointing to “the generalized
availability of tribal [governmental] services,” because general regulatory
jurisdiction over non-tribal members under Montana’s consensual
relationship exception “would swallow the [general Montana] rule . . .
67. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 387 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (indicating that later case law has divided on whether tribal
affiliation or tribal land ownership is more important to the Montana analysis).
68. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-67.
69. 532 U.S. 645, 656 (2001).
70. Id. at 648-49.
71. Id. at 647-48.
72. Id. at 648-49.
73. Id. at 654-57.
74. Id. at 656.
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ignor[ing] the dependent status of Indian tribes and subvert[ing] the
territorial restriction upon tribal power.” 75 A non-Indian forming a
“consensual relationship in one area . . . is not ‘in for a penny, in for a
Pound.’” 76
Ultimately, the Court reasoned, the tribe lacked regulatory jurisdiction
for the tax upon hotel guests because the relationship it sought to regulate
was that of the non-tribal hotelier and his non-tribal guests, so there was no
nexus between the tax and any consensual tribal relationship. 77
The Strate decision also served a limiting function, restricting Montana’s
Self-Governance Exception to a similar form of specific jurisdiction. 78
Strate held that federal courts should uphold tribal civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians under the Self-Governance Exception only where tribal
jurisdiction is “necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control
internal relations.” 79 In Strate, non-tribal motorist Gisela Fredericks sued in
tribal court for claims related to an automobile collision on a state highway
right-of-way running through tribal-owned land on the Three Affiliated
Tribes’ reservation. 80 Fredericks’s passenger vehicle collided with a
commercial gravel truck driven by a non-tribal employee of non-tribal
business A-1 Contractors, headquartered off reservation. 81 At the time of
the collision, however, A-1 was the landscaping subcontractor for tribal
LCM Corporation’s tribal building project located on reservation. 82
Fredericks sued in tribal court, and named the gravel truck driver and A1 Contractors as defendants. 83 Prior to exhausting all appeals, A-1 and its
driver sued in federal court seeking to enjoin the tribal court from
continuing the suit for want of jurisdiction. 84 Upon appeal, the Supreme
75. Id. at 655.
76. Id. at 656.
77. See id. at 656-57.
78. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 367 n.8 (2001) (indicating Strate provides for
specific subject-matter jurisdiction). But see id. at 403 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(indicating that Strate provides for specific personal jurisdiction).
79. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997); Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544, 566 (1981) (articulating a second exception providing for tribes’ “retain[ed]
inherent . . . civil authority” with respect to non-tribal parties on non-tribal land within the
reservation “when [their] conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe”).
80. Strate, 520 U.S. at 442-43.
81. Id. at 443.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 443-44 (explaining that Fredericks’ five Indian children also sued the same
defendants for loss of consortium).
84. Id. at 444.
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Court granted that injunction, 85 reasoning that tribes generally may not
exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, except as provided for in
statutes or treaties. 86 Alternatively, where statutes and treaties are silent on
the matter, Montana’s exceptions may grant tribal civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians. 87 But, with respect to Montana’s Self-Governance Exception,
the rationale for the exception is defeated where a non-tribal party’s suitinducing conduct occurred on non-tribal land. 88
Thus, in Strate, the federal government’s grant to the state of a right-ofway to build the state highway effectively changed the character of the
once-tribal land to non-tribal for questions of tribal civil jurisdiction
because the Three Affiliated Tribes were largely stripped of their “right to
exercise dominion or control” over the land. 89
In analyzing the Montana exceptions, the Court in Strate quickly
dismissed the Consensual Relationship Exception largely because the Three
Affiliated Tribes had no relationship to the crash, though it devoted more
analysis to the Self-Governance Exception. 90 In looking for a threat to the
tribes’ “political integrity, . . . economic security, or . . . health or welfare,”
the Court required more than a generalized reckless driving threat to “all in
the vicinity.” 91 Rather, under the Self-Governance Exception, perceived
threats to retained tribal sovereignty give rise to tribal civil jurisdiction only
where such jurisdiction is “necessary to protect tribal self-government or to
85. Id. at 444-45.
86. Id. at 445 (“[A]bsent express authorization by federal statute or treaty, tribal
jurisdiction over the conduct of nonmembers exists only in limited circumstances.”).
87. Id. at 446 (“The Montana opinion added . . . that in certain circumstances, even
where Congress has not expressly authorized it, tribal civil jurisdiction may encompass
nonmembers.”); id. at 449 (“As the Court made plain in Montana, the general rule and
exceptions there announced govern only in the absence of a delegation of tribal authority by
treaty or statute.”).
88. See id. at 456 (indicating that where the situs of the suit-inducing conduct is located
upon a state’s right-of-way, being land “alienated to non-Indians,” the tribe lacks “a
landowner’s right to occupy and exclude” and therefore has no interest in self-governance on
that land); id. at 459 (“Neither regulatory nor adjudicatory authority over the state highway
accident at issue is needed to preserve ‘the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them.’ . . . The Montana rule, therefore, and not its exceptions, applies
to this case.”) (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)).
89. Id. at 455; see also id. at 456 (“Tribe’s loss of ‘right of absolute and exclusive use
and occupation . . . implies the loss of regulatory jurisdiction over the use of the land by
others.’” (quoting South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 689 (1993)); New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333 (1983).
90. Strate, 520 U.S. at 456-57.
91. Id. at 457-58.
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control internal relations.” 92 Ultimately, the Supreme Court held the tribal
court need not hear Fredericks’s traffic collision suit to defend the Three
Affiliated Tribes’ self-governance, reasoning that hauling the non-tribal
defendants into “an unfamiliar court” fails to stem any of the threats
identified by the Self-Governance Exception. 93
III. Problems
As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes noted, “hard cases . . . make bad
law.” 94 Unfortunately, the doctrine of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-tribal
parties has developed almost exclusively from hard cases; Nevada v. Hicks
was, perhaps, the hardest. Although the Court in Hicks tried to guard
against bad law in this factually unusual case, limiting its holding “to the
question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state
law,” 95 Hicks’s heavily fractured Court still manages to confuse an already
convoluted canon of tribal civil jurisdiction. 96 Hicks produced a six-justice
majority, though four of the justices who signed the majority opinion also
filed or signed concurrences. 97
Hicks’s confounding effect is especially pronounced considering the
displacement of five of the nine justices who heard the 2001 case. 98 Now,
92. See id. at 459.
93. Id.; see also id. at 459 n.13 (analogizing to the rule of federal civil procedure that
“when nonresidents are the sole defendants in a suit filed in state court, the defendants
ordinarily may remove the case to federal court” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012)).
94. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 364 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
95. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358 n.2 (2001). But see id. at 376 (“[A]lthough the
holding in this case is ‘limited to the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers
enforcing state law,’ one rule independently supporting that holding . . . is not so confined.”)
(quoting id. at 358 n.2) (Souter, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
96. See id. at 376 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Reply Brief for Petitioners at 16)
(“Petitioners are certainly correct that ‘[t]ribal adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmembers
is . . . ill-defined,’ since this Court’s own pronouncements on the issue have pointed in
seemingly opposite directions.”) (citation omitted); id. at 387 (O’Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (“[W]e have equivocated . . . in the past” on whether
“Montana v. United States governs a tribe’s civil jurisdiction over nonmembers regardless of
land ownership.”).
97. See generally id. at 375-404 (listing a concurrence by Souter, joined by two justices;
a concurrence by Ginsburg; a concurrence by O’Connor, joined by two justices; and a
concurrence by Stevens, joined by one justice).
98. See Robert Barnes & Gail Sullivan, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia Dies at 79,
THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supremecourt-justice-antonin-scalia-dies-at-79/2016/02/13/effe8184-a62f-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf3
9c_story.html (documenting Justice Antonin Scalia’s death); Charles Babington & Peter Baker,
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only three of the justices who signed the Hicks majority remain after the
death of Justice Scalia, who delivered the opinion of the court, and the
replacements of Justices Rehnquist and Souter. 99 Furthermore, speculation
continues regarding the retirement of Justice Ginsburg, who likewise signed
the Hicks majority opinion. 100 In light of this significant change in the
Court’s composition, it has become much more difficult to predict the
Court’s sentiments on the contentious, unsettled, and convoluted issue of
tribal civil jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, the uncertainty is not without consequences, and these
consequences are of larger magnitude than mere frustration. Theoretical and
anecdotal evidence from the fields of financial economics, 101 business
strategy, 102 and even Supreme Court precedent 103 suggest a correlation
Roberts Confirmed as 17th Chief Justice, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2005), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/29/AR2005092900859.html
(identifying
Chief Justice John Roberts as the replacement for deceased Chief Justice William Rehnquist);
Laura Litvan, Kagan to Be Sworn in as 112th Court Justice Tomorrow, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS
(Aug. 6, 2010, 1:47 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-08-05/kagan-isconfirmed-by-senate-as-obama-s-second-appointee-to-supreme-court (identifying current Justice
Elena Kagan as the replacement for retired Justice John Paul Stevens); Charlie Savage, Sotomayor
Confirmed by Senate, 68-31, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/08/07/us/politics/07confirm.html?_r=0 (identifying current Justice Sonia Sotomayor as the
replacement for retired Justice David Souter); David Stout, Alito Is Sworn in as Justice After 5842 Vote to Confirm Him, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/31/
politics/politicsspecial1/31cnd-alito.html?_r=0 (identifying current Justice Samuel Alito as the
replacement for former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor).
99. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 354.
100. See id.; Greg Stohr, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Has Stent Implanted, Supreme Court
Says, BLOOMBERGPOLITICS (Nov. 26, 2014, 9:25 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/
articles/2014-11-26/justice-ginsburg-has-stent-implanted-us-supreme-court-says
(explaining
that Ginsburg received a heart stent in November 2014 and has been battling cancer for more
than a decade but “has no plans to retire anytime soon,” although some have suggested the
then-eighty-one-year-old “leader of [the Court’s] liberal wing” should tender her retirement
prior to the expiration of Barack Obama’s presidential term in 2017).
101. See, e.g., Bruno Solnik & Luo Zuo, A Global Equilibrium Asset Pricing Model with
Home Preference, 58 M GMT. SCI. 273, 273 (2012) (discussing risk aversion theory); ZVI
BODIE ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF INVESTMENTS 190 (Brent Gordon et al. eds., 8th ed., 2010)
(discussing the risk-return relationship under the capital asset pricing model); see also Ralph
J. Brown & Scott Selk, Economic Trends on the American Indian Reservation in South
Dakota, S.D. BUS. REV., June 2003, at 1, 13-14 (discussing the role of tribal governance and
law in hindering economic development); infra Section III.C.
102. See, e.g., HOSKISSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 288 (discussing the relationship
between political risk and “direct foreign investment”); see also infra Section III.C.
103. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 32122 (2008) (describing a bank’s decision to offer less favorable financing or leasing terms to a
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between tribal Jurisdictional Risk and the avoidance of non-tribal
investment in Indian Country. As will be explored in subsections (B)-(C),
perhaps this effect contributed to the bank’s express recognition of
“possible jurisdictional problems” and its allegedly favorable lending to
non-tribal borrowers in Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and
Cattle Co. 104
Therefore, considering that “Native Americans suffer higher rates of . . .
[general socioeconomic] ills than . . . any other group in the United
States” 105—owing partially to their struggle “to engage . . . outside
investors in economic activities” 106—confusion in the doctrine of tribal
civil jurisdiction remains a very sizable problem.
A. As Exemplified in Nevada v. Hicks, the Current Canon of Tribal Civil
Jurisdiction Is Rampant with Uncertainty and Inconsistency
There is no easy way to analyze Hicks—a fifty-one-page, fourconcurrence, factually bizarre case filled with legal obscurities. This
comment aims merely to extract the case’s most generalized propositions,
and especially those that apply to the nexus of tribal civil procedure and
non-tribal investment.
In Hicks, as part of the investigation of the off-reservation slaying of a
bighorn sheep, a Nevada game warden, suspecting an Indian named Hicks,
twice acquired from a Nevada court a search warrant and twice received
approval from the Fallon Tribal Court to execute the warrant.107 Neither
search produced evidence that Hicks had slain a bighorn. 108 In response to
the second search, Hicks filed suit in the Fallon Tribal Court against
multiple parties, claiming property damage and an improper search. 109 The
only claims reviewed by the United States Supreme Court were those
tribal-owned, on-reservation company due to concerns about tribal civil jurisdiction); see
also infra Section III.C; cf. Brief for South Dakota Bankers Ass’n as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 5-6, Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, No. 131496 (U.S. July 18, 2014) (“The non-conformity and uncertainty with how courts are
interpreting Montana and its exceptions is discouraging to nonmembers and off-reservation
businesses wishing to explore markets on Indian reservations. . . . [B]usinesses . . . limit the
amount of business they do on-reservations . . . because the risk associated with not knowing
the rules before the game begins simply outweighs the potential economic benefit.”).
104. 554 U.S. at 322 (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. 25 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(8) (2012).
106. Id. § 4301(a)(7).
107. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 355-56.
108. Id. at 356.
109. Id.
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against the state of Nevada and the state wardens involved in the
searches. 110
The wardens appealed to the Supreme Court on claims arising under
tribal tort law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983—claims filed against the wardens in
their official capacities—arguing that the tribal court had no jurisdiction to
adjudicate the claims. 111 In analyzing the tribal tort law claims, Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected the tribal court’s regulatory
jurisdiction over the tribal tort law claims on a tribal-state sovereignty
balancing theory, 112 but the doctrinal take-away from this component of the
analysis is the clarification that Montana’s “general rule”—a presumption
against tribal civil jurisdiction over non-tribal parties—applies regardless of
whether land is Indian-owned. 113 As such, land “ownership status . . . is
only one factor to consider in determining whether [Indian] regulation [of
non-Indians] . . . is ‘necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control
internal relations’” under the Self-Governance Exception to the general
rule. 114 Land identity can, however, be “dispositive” to the self-governance
inquiry—indeed, it is near certain that tribal civil jurisdiction will not be
upheld where the land is non-Indian owned. 115 The factor of land ownership
is, however, less compelling—and the question of tribal civil jurisdiction is
less certain—where the transaction occurs on Indian-owned land, because
Indian land ownership does not automatically create regulatory jurisdiction
with respect to the conduct of non-Indians on that land. 116
With respect to the § 1983 claims, the majority again held the tribal court
lacked adjudicatory authority, reasoning that unlike state courts, tribal
courts are not courts of general jurisdiction. 117 State courts’ general
110. Id.
111. Id. at 356-57.
112. Id. at 361.
113. Id. at 359-60.
114. Id.; Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (providing for tribes’
“retain[ed] inherent . . . civil authority” with respect to non-tribal parties on non-tribal land
within the reservation “when [their] conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe”).
115. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360. But see Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 443-44, 458-59 (1989) (opinions of Stevens, J., and
Blackmun, J.) (allowing tribal regulatory jurisdiction over non-tribal parcel enclosed within
the reservation).
116. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360 (citing Brendale, 492 U.S. at 443-44, 458-59 (1989)
(opinions of Stevens, J., and Blackmun, J.)).
117. Id. at 366, 374. But see id. at 403 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Given a tribal assertion
of general subject-matter jurisdiction, we should recognize a tribe’s authority to adjudicate
claims arising under § 1983 unless federal law dictates otherwise.”).
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jurisdiction stems from their historically-retained “inherent authority” under
federal-state sovereignty and from positive empowerment to “enforce
federal law . . . presumed by Article III of the Constitution.” 118 Given that
tribal courts lack both “historical and constitutional assumption[s] of
concurrent state-court jurisdiction over federal-law,” the majority reasoned
that tribal courts must be courts of limited jurisdiction. 119 As courts of
limited jurisdiction, tribal courts’ “inherent adjudicative jurisdiction over
nonmembers is at most only as broad as its legislative jurisdiction.” 120
Thus, tribal courts have no jurisdiction over federal law claims “absent
congressional specification to the contrary.”121 Ultimately, the majority held
that in the absence of any positive legislation authorizing the tribe to
adjudicate § 1983 claims, these did not fall within the tribal court’s
jurisdiction. 122
Thus, having rejected tribal court jurisdiction over all claims, the
majority reversed and held in favor of the state wardens. 123
1. The Court Cannot Agree on the Role of Land in the Jurisdictional
Analysis
In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor appeared concerned with the future
application of the Montana doctrine, which was the “best source of
‘coherence in the various manifestations of the general law of tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians’” 124—despite the fact that Montana itself was
somewhat incoherent. 125 Specifically, O’Connor objected to the majority’s
deviation from the Montana doctrine in giving the factor of tribal land
ownership short shrift. 126 The majority’s rationale broke from precedent,
she argued, by quickly dismissing “the fact that the state officials’
118. Id. at 366-67 (citing Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990).
119. Id. at 367.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 366-67.
122. See id. at 367-68.
123. Id. at 375.
124. Id. at 388 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 659 (Souter, J., concurring)).
125. Id. at 387 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(“Montana . . . was not clear whether the status of the persons being regulated, or the status
of the land . . . led the Court to develop Montana’s jurisdictional rule . . . .”).
126. See id. at 388, 392 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (“The Court’s reasoning suffers from . . . giv[ing] only passing consideration to
the fact that the state officials’ activities in this case occurred on land owned . . . by the
Tribes . . . .”).
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activities . . . occurred on land owned and controlled by the Tribes,”
“giv[ing only] a passing nod to land status.”127 The majority’s analysis of
such an important factor, she argued, was insufficient given a history of
Court “equivocat[ion]” and thus demonstrated a large “oversight.” 128
Whereas the majority would apply the Montana presumption against
tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians regardless of land status, 129 Justice
O’Connor, invoking the Self-Governance Exception, 130 noted that threats to
the tribes “are far more likely to be implicated where . . . the nonmember
activity takes place on land owned and controlled by the tribe.” 131
However, even before the majority broke from the Montana line of
precedent, the Court had previously been attempting to cope with
“occup[ying] a middle ground between [its] cases that provide for nearly
absolute tribal sovereignty over tribe members and our rule that tribes have
no inherent criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers.” 132 Thus, Justice
O’Connor argued, “If Montana is to bring coherence to our case law, we
must apply it with due consideration to land status, which has always
figured prominently in our analysis of tribal jurisdiction.” 133
Justice Souter’s concurrence, on the other hand, argued for eliminating
land as a primary jurisdictional fact to prevent the creation of “an unstable
jurisdictional crazy quilt” stemming from the fact that “land on Indian
reservations constantly changes hands.” 134 Such an effect is problematic,
Justice Souter explains, because a jurisdictional rule relying primarily on
land status “would prove extraordinarily difficult to administer and would
provide little notice to nonmembers.” 135 Rather, he argued, land ownership

127. Id. at 388, 392, 395 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
128. Id. at 387, 395 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
129. Id. at 359-60.
130. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981) (providing for tribes’
“retain[ed] inherent . . . civil authority” with respect to non-tribal parties on non-tribal land
within the reservation “when [their] conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe”).
131. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 395 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
132. Id. at 391-92 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 395 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
134. Id. at 383 (Souter, J., concurring); accord id. at 359-60 (indicating that the majority
largely agreed with Justice Souter, though the majority was somewhat less explicit as to the
role of land).
135. Id. at 383 (Souter, J., concurring).
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“is relevant only insofar as it bears on the application of one of Montana’s
exceptions.” 136
Notice to non-Indians of susceptibility to tribal civil jurisdiction is
especially important due to “‘[t]he special nature of [Indian] tribunals’ . . .
which differ from traditional American courts in a number of significant
respects,” 137 including differences in parties’ fundamental procedural rights,
court structure, applicable law, judicial independence, and availability of
review. 138
Justice Souter first invoked case law to argue against making land a
primary jurisdictional fact, stating that “[t]he [presumption against civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians] on which Montana and Strate were
decided . . . looks first to human relationships, not land records”—with “the
membership status of the unconsenting party . . . [being] the primary
jurisdictional fact”—“and it should make no difference per se whether acts
committed on a reservation occurred on tribal land or on land owned by a
nonmember.” 139
Justice Souter also referred to the history of tribal sovereignty and policy
considerations. 140 He reasoned that tribal authority over non-Indians has
consistently remained “narrowly confined,” as demonstrated by treaties
with the Five Civilized Tribes expressly “exclud[ing] jurisdiction over
nonmembers” 141 and federal statutes from the 1800s delegating to tribal
courts jurisdiction over purely Indian disputes, while preserving in “the
courts of the United States jurisdiction of all actions to which its own
citizens are parties on either side.” 142
2. The Majority’s Inconsistent Treatment of Congressional Silence
Creates Confusion
Justices Stevens and Breyer also objected to the majority’s
pronouncement that tribal courts are only courts of specific subject matter

136. Id. at 375-76 (Souter, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 383 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693
(1990)).
138. Id. at 383-85 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting, of strong significance, that “the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment do not of their own force apply to Indian tribes”).
139. Id. at 381-82 (Souter, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 382 (Souter, J., concurring).
141. Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130,
171, 171 n. 21 (1982) (dissenting opinion)).
142. Id. at 382-83 (Souter, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In
re Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107, 116 (1891)).
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jurisdiction. 143 While the majority assumed “that tribal courts do not have
jurisdiction to hear federal claims,” such as § 1983 claims, absent federal
congressional authorization, 144 Justice Stevens would assume under
congressional silence that “the question whether tribal courts are courts of
general jurisdiction is fundamentally one of tribal law,” yielding generally
to “tribal assertion of general subject-matter jurisdiction.” 145
Justice Stevens’s analysis was “not based upon any mystical attribute of
sovereignty, as the majority suggests, but rather upon the simple,
commonsense notion that it is the body creating a court that determines
what sorts of claims that court will hear.” 146 Justice Stevens further
reasoned that “[n]ow and then silence is not pregnant” and that
“[i]nadvertence seems the most likely [explanation]” for § 1983’s failure to
mention its application in tribal courts. 147 In the analogous application of §
1983 in state courts the Court has merely assumed and “never questioned”
state courts’ general jurisdiction “to provide the relief it authorizes.” 148
3. Hicks Buries Additional Layers of Confusion and Uncertainty in Terse
Footnotes and Unanswered Questions
The uncertainty in Hicks extends beyond direct conflicts between the
majority and concurrences into oblique and minimally analyzed asides in
the footnotes. In responding to Justice Stevens’s criticisms regarding the
general jurisdiction of tribal courts, only in a footnote does the majority
specify that “Strate’s limitation on jurisdiction over nonmembers pertains
to subject-matter, rather than merely personal, jurisdiction.” 149 Although
this statement is binding law, 150 the majority’s five-sentence footnote
analysis of the issue creates substantial confusion considering that the
143. See generally id. at 366-69; id. at 401-04 (Stevens, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 402 (Stevens, J., concurring).
145. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 403 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted); see also id. (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“The questions whether that court has the power to compel anyone to listen to it
and whether its assertion of subject-matter jurisdiction conflicts with some higher law are
separate issues.”).
147. Id. at 404 (quoting El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 487 (1999)).
148. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 367 n.8.
150. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 352 (Harvard
Univ. Press ed., 2009) (indicating that footnotes are binding because “[t]he court’s holdings
are authoritative wherever they appear on the page”). See generally Robert A. James, Are
Footnotes in Opinions Given Full Precedential Effect?, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 267 (1999); Ira
Brad Matetsky, The Footnote Argument—Sustained at Last?, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 33 (2002).
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dichotomy of specific and general subject matter jurisdiction is typically
addressed with respect to personal jurisdiction in the canon of federal civil
jurisdiction. 151 This confusion is compounded by the fact that many cases
on tribal civil jurisdiction fail to mention the concepts of personal and
subject matter jurisdiction altogether, 152 leaving this dichotomy within
tribal civil jurisdiction ambiguous throughout the U.S.—with the exception
of the Ninth Circuit. 153
Justice Souter’s concurrence also inserts a footnote that would render the
entire canon of tribal civil jurisdiction unintelligible if it were binding law,
owing to the Court’s decades of loose language. 154 Justice Souter
recognized that the Montana Court used the terms “nonmembers” and
“non-Indians” interchangeably 155—a trend that has been largely replicated
among Montana’s progeny. According to Justice Souter, “the relevant
distinction, as we implicitly acknowledged in Strate, is between members
and nonmembers of the tribe.” 156 In his four-sentence footnote, Justice
Souter failed to consider the linguistic implications of distinguishing the
Court’s consistent muddling of “nonmember” and “non-Indian.” If Justice
Souter’s footnote were to be binding law, it would raise an unanswerable

151. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (“Although the placement
of a product into the stream of commerce ‘may bolster an affiliation germane to specific
jurisdiction,’ . . . such contacts ‘do not warrant a determination that, based on those ties, the
forum has general jurisdiction over a defendant.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846 (2011)); see also Atkinson Trading
Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 656 (2001) (ruling that Montana’s consensual relationship
exception provides merely specific regulatory jurisdiction over non-tribal parties operating
on non-tribal land); Katosha Belvin Nakai, Red Rover, Red Rover: A Call for Comity in
Linking Tribal and State Long-Arm Provisions for Service of Process in Indian Country, 35
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 633, 669 (2003) (“Hicks collapsed . . . the traditional subject matter and
personal jurisdiction analysis.”).
152. See Red Fox v. Hettich, 494 N.W.2d 638, 642-43 (S.D. 1993) (“[A] review of the
cases of the United States Supreme Court reveals that the analysis of jurisdictional issues
between Indian and federal or state governments is rarely broken down into the traditional
facets of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. . . . [T]his failure to analyze questions of
tribal jurisdiction through jurisdiction’s traditional component parts does not promote clarity
of jurisdictional analysis.”). See generally, e.g., Shirley, 532 U.S. 645; Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (demonstrating the
difficulty of untangling the issue of personal or subject matter jurisdiction).
153. See generally Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802
(9th Cir. 2011); see also infra Section IV.A.
154. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 377 n.2 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring).
155. See id. (Souter, J., concurring).
156. See id. (Souter, J., concurring).
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question: how should the Court untangle the linguistically imprecise,
factually complex case law in new, also factually complex cases?
Finally, Hicks recognized and declined to answer two important
questions. 157 The first of which was “the question of tribal-court jurisdiction
over nonmember defendants in general”—for example, those not acting as
state officials. 158 The second, which was also important in answering the
first question, was, “the question [of] whether a tribe’s adjudicative
jurisdiction over nonmember defendants equals its legislative
jurisdiction.” 159
B. The Current Canon Incentivizes Discrimination in Transactions
Given the confusion of the doctrine of tribal civil jurisdiction as
exemplified by Hicks, it is not surprising that Investors have subsequently
sought to avoid subjecting themselves to tribal civil jurisdiction altogether.
Indeed, the problem is most clearly illustrated by Plains Commerce Bank v.
Long Family Land and Cattle Co., which also illustrates that Jurisdictional
Risk may cause allegedly discriminatory effects in transactions to the
detriment of Native Americans.
1. Plains Commerce Illustrates Alleged Transactional Discrimination
Against Native Americans for the Purpose of Avoiding Tribal
Jurisdiction and Shifting Economic Costs
Doctrinally, Plains Commerce stands for the proposition that neither
Montana exception can permit tribal regulation of non-Indian land sales
because the regulations cover only non-tribal “conduct,” from which the
Supreme Court distinguished non-tribal land sales. 160 However, Plains

157. See id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“I write separately only to emphasize that
Strate v. A-1 Contractors . . . similarly deferred larger issues . . . [W]e ‘express[ed] no view
on the governing law or proper forum’ for cases arising out of nonmember conduct on tribal
land. The Court’s opinion . . . does not reach out definitively to answer the[se] jurisdictional
questions left open . . . .”) (quoting Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997))
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 358 n.2; see also id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (explaining that the
court also declined to decide this jurisdictional question as it relates to “state officials
engaged on tribal land in a venture or frolic of their own”); id. at 396 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The Court . . . never explains where
these, or more serious allegations involving a breach of authority, would fall within its new
rule of state official immunity.”).
159. Id. at 358, 374 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
160. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 340-41.
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Commerce is most significant in that it illustrates a correlation between
Jurisdictional Risk and Investor avoidance of Indian Country.
In this 2008 case before the Supreme Court, the Sioux majority
shareholders of Long Family Land and Cattle Company sued Plains
Commerce Bank, alleging that the bank offered better terms to non-tribal
customers in lending and land transactions. 161 The tribal shareholders
claimed the bank explained its favoritism toward non-tribal borrowers as
resulting from the risk of “‘possible jurisdictional problems’ that might
have been caused by the Bank financing an ‘Indian owned entity on the
reservation.’” 162
The conflict arose out of a nearly twenty-year commercial relationship
between the bank and the Long’s family corporation located on the
Cheyenne River Sioux reservation on land alienated from the tribe,
although the relationship began with the corporation’s former, non-tribal
owner. 163 The opinion suggests that the majority ownership of the Long
corporation shifted from non-tribal to tribal prior to or as a result of the
prior non-tribal owner’s 1995 death. 164 The corporation and the decedent’s
son, now serving with his wife as majority shareholders, were indebted
$750,000 to the bank, and the Long Company’s performance was
“flagging,” so the new majority shareholders sought refinancing. 165
The Long family did refinance, and achieved a new loan contract and
lease agreement. 166 In connection with the new loan, the shareholders
avoided foreclosure and achieved partial debt cancellation, but
unfortunately at a cost of transferring 2,230 mortgaged acres to the bank. 167
The bank subsequently leased this acreage back to the Long Company for a
period of two years, including a repurchase option with an exercise price of
$468,000. 168 This less-optimal lease came only after the bank, fearing
Jurisdictional Risk, rescinded its original offer to “sell the land back . . .
with a 20-year contract for deed.” 169
Less than a year after signing, a severe winter caused the deaths of
hundreds of Long cattle, and the ranch could not afford to repurchase the
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 320.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 320-21, 340.
Id. at 321.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 322.
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acreage by the end of the two-year lease. 170 Subsequently, the bank sold the
land to non-Indians under unspecified terms the Longs claimed were more
favorable. 171
The Longs sued in tribal court, and the bank sought summary judgment,
arguing against tribal court jurisdiction. 172 The tribal court denied summary
judgment, ultimately awarding the Longs $750,000 and a repurchase option
for 960 acres. 173
Having exhausted tribal appeals, the bank sought a federal court
judgment declaring a lack of tribal jurisdiction. 174 After the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the federal district court’s judgments in favor of the ranch, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 175
The Supreme Court reasoned that the Longs’ suit was “an attempt to
regulate the terms on which the Bank may sell the land it owns” and held
that the tribal court lacked regulatory jurisdiction. 176 Regulatory jurisdiction
was lacking because the land had been alienated from the tribe, depriving
the tribal court of retained inherent authority, and neither Montana
exception applied. 177
Both Montana exceptions, “stem[ming] from the same sovereign
interests . . . do not reach to regulating the sale of non-Indian fee land”
because, the Court ruled, the exceptions merely permit (in specific
circumstances) tribal regulation of non-tribal “conduct,” to be distinguished
from non-tribal “sale[s] of land.” 178 Unlike regulation of conduct, such as
barring entry to tribal land or taxing specific actions, the regulation of nontribal land transfers is not empowered by tribal sovereignty because any
damage to tribal “political integrity,” under the Montana analysis, occurred
with the original transfer to a non-tribal party. 179
Reasoning that the tribal court could have no adjudicatory jurisdiction in
the absence of regulatory jurisdiction, the Court reversed, nullifying the
Longs’ tribal court judgment. 180

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 322-23.
Id. at 323.
Id.
Id. at 330, 340.
See id. at 339-41.
Id. at 340-41.
Id. at 335-36 (“Resale, by itself, causes no additional damage.”).
Id. at 330, 342.
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2. All Plains Commerce Justices Agree That Current Law on Tribal Civil
Jurisdiction Condones Transactional Discrimination Against Native
Americans
Admittedly, the Longs appear to have been high-risk debtors, given
substantial outstanding debt, an assumed lack of extensive experience
managing their newly owned company, and an apparent lack of livestock
insurance. Therefore, it would only be rational—and acceptably ethical—
for a lending institution to extend less favorable lending terms or to be
highly conservative in structuring a leasing agreement that appears to be at
least partially motivated to rescue the Longs from a looming foreclosure.
A separate opinion signed by four justices, however, emphasized the
unacceptability of considering the Longs’ tribal affiliation as a factor in
imposing less favorable terms. In this opinion, Justice Ginsburg criticized
the Plains Commerce majority’s failure to uphold the tribe’s “authority to
shield its members against discrimination by those engaging in onreservation commercial relationships” when this same authority has been
granted to federal, state, and local governments. 181
The very fact that questions of tribal civil jurisdiction consider tribal
affiliation—a close proxy for race—as a factor seems problematic under
many modern understandings of equal protection. 182 If the current canon of
tribal civil jurisdiction were to receive a constitutional challenge—
especially considering early policies of tribal assimilation 183—a well-pled

181. Id. at 348-49 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (5-4 decision); see,
e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-49) (effective Jan.
21, 2013) (“It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with
respect to any aspect of a credit transaction . . . on the basis of race . . . .”).
182. Compare Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 496 (2000) (indicating that “[a]ncestry
can be a proxy for race” and that “racial discrimination is that which singles out ‘identifiable
classes of persons . . . solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics’”) (quoting
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987)), with United States v.
Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645 (1977) (“The decisions of this Court leave no doubt that federal
legislation with respect to Indian tribes, although relating to Indians as such, is not based
upon impermissible racial classifications. . . . Legislation with respect to these ‘unique
aggregations’ has repeatedly been sustained by this Court against claims of unlawful racial
discrimination.”); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-54 n.24 (1974) (holding that a
Bureau of Indian Affairs employment preference for tribal members “does not constitute
‘racial discrimination’” because it “is political rather than racial in nature”).
183. See generally Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
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claim highlighting the quasi-racial classification could potentially trigger
strict scrutiny. 184
Although the tribal jurisdictional factor of parties’ tribal affiliations
smacks of “separate but equal” justice, 185 the Plains Commerce majority,
responding to Justice Ginsburg’s separate opinion, writes that “[t]he
sovereign authority of Indian tribes is limited in ways state and federal
authority is not . . . [and] that bedrock principle does not vary depending on
the desirability of a particular regulation.” 186 Thus, the majority adopted a
formalist approach, but this statement gives credence to Justice Ginsburg’s
normative concerns. 187
Considering that both Plains Commerce opinions—or all nine justices—
recognized the desirability of avoiding discrimination against Indians in
transactions with non-tribal parties, perhaps the legislature should take
advantage of its ability to modify the law of tribal civil jurisdiction to

184. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. . . . [C]ourts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes
justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.”); United States v.
Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938) (suggesting without deciding that
“prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition . . . which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry”). But see, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks,
533 U.S. 353, 383-84 (2001) (stating that “the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment
do not of their own force apply to Indian tribes. . . . Although the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968 (ICRA) makes a handful of analogous safeguards”—including equal protection—
though ICRA’s equal protection is not closely moored to federal precedent); Hayden v.
County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 48 (2d. Cir. 1999) (citing multiple Supreme Court
precedents to articulate an equal protection framework specifying that “a law . . . is
discriminatory on its face if it expressly classifies persons on the basis of race,” “a law
which is facially neutral violates equal protection if . . . applied in a discriminatory fashion,”
and, alternatively, “a facially neutral statute violates equal protection if . . . motivated by
discriminatory animus and its application results in a discriminatory effect”).
185. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“Separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs . . . are, by reason of the
segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
186. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 340.
187. See, e.g., id. at 348-49 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“The
Federal Government and every State, county, and municipality can make nondiscrimination
the law governing contracts generally, and real property transactions in particular. . . . Why
should the Tribe lack comparable authority to shield its members against discrimination by
those engaging in on-reservation commercial relationships—including land-secured
lending—with them?”).
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further this policy goal. 188 Such a legislative response should consider the
interests of individual Indians in fair transactions and the tribes’ interests in
sovereignty and self-governance, which includes the judicial shaping of
their own tribal business law. Furthermore, the financial literature suggests
that the legislature should also consider the interests of Investors in
applying appropriate transactional risk premiums and strategies for
reducing risk to enhance the flow of capital to Indian Country.
C. The Current Canon’s Uncertainty Discourages Non-Tribal Investment in
Tribal Economies
Uncertainty in tribal civil jurisdiction such as that caused by Hicks is
extremely discouraging to Investors. Indeed, given the existence of
Jurisdictional Risk, Investor reluctance to invest in the tribes can be
explained on two theoretical bases.
First, as an initial matter, investors display “home bias,” a psychological
preference for investing in domestic assets. 189 The bias is so strong that
investors often forgo “gains to be made from international portfolio
diversification in terms of pure risk reduction” as compared to investments
in “purely national portfolios.” 190 Therefore, even given an ideal legal
structure, tribes would have to overcome this sometimes-irrational impulse
to avoid cross-border transfers of capital.

188. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 17 (1987) (“Congress undoubtedly
has the power to limit tribal court jurisdiction . . . .”); Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow
Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851 (1985) (“[T]he power of the Federal Government over
the Indian tribes is plenary.”); Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission
Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 787 n.30 (1984) (“[I]t is clear that all aspects of Indian sovereignty
are subject to defeasance by Congress . . . .”); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 562
(1981) (“If Congress had wished to extend tribal jurisdiction [over hunting and fishing] to
lands owned by non-Indians, it could easily have done so by incorporating in [18 U.S.C.] §
1165 the definition of ‘Indian country’ in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 . . . .”).
189. See Solnik & Zuo, supra note 101, at 273 (“[I]nvestors suffer from foreign aversion,
a preference for home assets based on familiarity. . . . Foreign aversion . . . leads investors to
underinvest in foreign stocks in order to reduce the potential for regret, thereby creating a
home bias.”); BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 614 (“[I]nvestor portfolios notoriously
overweight home-country stocks . . . and underweight, or even completely ignore, foreign
equities.”). Other scholars find that home bias occurs even domestically. See Joshua D.
Coval & Tobias J. Moskowitz, Home Bias at Home: Local Equity Preference in Domestic
Portfolios, 54 J. FIN. 2045, 2048 (1999) (“[A]s much as one-third of the home bias puzzle
may only be a feature of a geographic proximity preference and the relative scale of the
world economy, rather than a consequence of national borders.”).
190. See, e.g., Linda L. Tesar & Ingrid M. Werner, Home Bias and High Turnover, 14 J.
INT’L MONEY & FIN. 467, 478 (1995).
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Second, Plains Commerce Bank offers anecdotal evidence suggesting
that Investors consider Jurisdictional Risk, assess risk premiums, and
generally try to avoid subjecting themselves to tribal civil jurisdiction in
capital-transferring activities. 191 The fact that the non-tribal bank in Plains
Commerce substituted its original financing terms to tribal parties for
drastically less favorable financing terms—assessing a heavy risk
premium—then ultimately chose to deal instead with non-tribal parties “on
more favorable terms” strongly suggests that Investors consider
Jurisdictional Risk to be a priced risk. 192
As indicated by asset pricing models derived from the Nobel Prizewinning Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), 193 “priced risk factors”
include any “uncertainties that might concern a large segment of
investors. . . sufficiently that they will demand meaningful risk premiums to
bear exposure to those sources of risk.” 194
191. See infra Section II.B.
192. See generally Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 349 (recounting a non-tribal
bank’s interactions with tribal parties in rescinding an original offer of a “20-year contract
for deed” in favor of “a two-year lease with an option to purchase” upon contemplating
“possible jurisdictional problems”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
Additional evidence may be found in SEC periodic filings. Regulation S-K requires
securities issuers to disclose in 10-K periodic filings, under the heading “Risk Factors,” “a
discussion of the most significant factors that make the [securities] offering speculative or
risky.” See 17 C.F.R. 229.503(c) (2011). At least one issuer has found Jurisdictional Risk
sufficiently risky that it felt compelled to disclose it in its 10-K filing. See, e.g., Cash Sys.,
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 8-9 (Apr. 1, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/861050/000095012408001688/v39158e10vk.htm#103 (indicating that the company is
“subject to . . . political risk associated with the majority of [its] customers being Native
American, Sovereign Nations,” pointing to, inter alia, the fact that “Tribes . . . may
determine their own . . . dispute processes” with few “limitation[s] on . . . Tribal
jurisdiction”).
193. Press Release, Nobelprize.org, This Year’s Laureates Are Pioneers in the Theory of
Financial Economics and Corporate Finance (Oct. 16, 1990), http://www.nobelprize.org/
nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1990/press.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2016)
(indicating that Professor William Sharpe was a co-recipient of the 1990 Nobel Prize in
Economic Sciences for his “pioneering” research that spawned the Capital Asset Pricing
Model). Modern scholars indicate that forms of absolute asset pricing, such as the CAPM,
can be universally used to “value a bundle of cashflows (dividends, coupons and principle,
option payoffs, firm profits, etc) based on its exposure to fundamental sources of
macroeconomic risk.” John H. Cochrane & Christopher L. Culp, Equilibrium Asset Pricing
and Discount Factors: Overview and Implications for Derivatives Valuation and Risk
Management, in MODERN RISK MANAGEMENT : A HISTORY 57, 58 (Sarah Jenkins & Tamsin
Kennedy eds., 2003).
194. BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 212 (emphasis omitted).
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However, priced risk is unfortunately a nuanced and developing concept
within the financial literature. An informed discussion thereof thus requires
background in the theory of the underlying CAPM. 195 Generally speaking,
the CAPM aims to “predict[] the relationship between the risk and
equilibrium expected returns on risky assets.” 196 However, the CAPM
assumes that “[a]ll investors . . . are rational mean-variance
optimizers” 197—that is, that all investors perform “the right kind of
diversification for the right reason.” 198
Diversification can be generally understood as an application of the
“age-old . . . adage ‘don’t put all your eggs in one basket.’” 199 To simplify,
efficient diversification requires investing “across industries because firms
in different industries . . . have lower covariances 200 than firms within an
industry.” 201 Or, more generally, when an investor “diversifies across
different financial assets with different risk characteristics, [that investor]
can reduce the total amount of risk faced.” 202
By diversifying their investments, investors can virtually eliminate a
component of total investment risk called nonsystematic, or firm-specific,
risk. 203 These risks are “those . . . that affect a particular security only,
leaving all others untouched.” 204 Because the CAPM assumes that investors

195. See Cochrane & Culp, supra note 193, at 87 (“[A] sound grasp of asset pricing
theory is required to define systematic risk.”).
196. BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 190.
197. Id.
198. See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 79, 89 (1952) (discussing the
“expected returns-variance of returns . . . rule”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
id. at 89 (indicating that “risk” and “variance of return” are generally interchangeable terms);
BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 114 (explaining that “expected return” and “mean return”
are interchangeable terms).
199. BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 145.
200. “Covariance” refers to “the fundamental measure of association between two
random variables.” Covariance, 1 THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
METHODS (1st ed. 2004).
201. Markowitz, supra note 198, at 89.
202. WILLIAM J. CARNEY, CORPORATE FINANCE : PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 122 (Robert
C. Clark et al. eds., 3d ed., 2015).
203. See BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 193, 205 (using “nonsystematic risk”
interchangeably with “firm-specific risk” and “diversifiable risk”). “Nonsystematic risk” is
also interchangeable with the term “idiosyncratic risk.” See, e.g., Cochrane & Culp, supra
note 193, at 65.
204. Cochrane & Culp, supra note 193, at 67 (identifying as “approximat[e]” examples
of nonsystematic risk “operational and liquidity risk, as well as those components of market
and credit risk that are unique to the firm in question”).
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rationally diversify their portfolios to eliminate nonsystematic risk, 205 an
asset’s nonsystematic risk does not necessitate application of a risk
premium. 206
However, under the CAPM’s “expected return-beta relationship,”
investors must receive “risk premiums . . . proportional to beta,” 207 a Greek
letter used in the financial literature to represent systematic risk. 208 Unlike
nonsystematic risk, systematic risk cannot be eliminated by diversification,
which is why investors demand compensation therefor. 209
Unfortunately, the financial literature has not reached a firm consensus
on what constitutes systematic risk. 210 The foundational CAPM model,
published by Professor William Sharpe in 1964, 211 assumed that systematic
risk is comprised solely of one risk: “the extent to which returns on [a]
stock respond to the returns of the market portfolio,” a theoretical portfolio
“which includes all assets of the security universe.” 212 Subsequent financial
research has concluded that Sharpe’s “beta does not tell the whole story of
risk.” 213 Rather, more contemporary studies suggest that there are “risk
factors that affect security returns beyond beta’s one-dimensional
measurement of market sensitivity.” 214

205. See BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 190.
206. Id. at 193; see also Cochrane & Culp, supra note 193, at 65 (“Idiosyncratic risks are
‘not priced’, meaning that you earn no more than the interest rate for holding them.”).
207. BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 193.
208. See id. at 194.
209. See id. at 193.
210. See generally id.at 205-07 (documenting contemporary challenges to the CAPM’s
beta, a “one-dimensional measurement of market sensitivity”); see also id. at 209 (indicating
that, under multifactor asset pricing models, it is “challeng[ing] . . . to identify the
empirically important [systematic risk] factors”); id. at 212 (“The single-index CAPM fails
empirical tests because the single-market index used to test these models fails to fully
explain returns on too many securities.”); Cochrane & Culp, supra note 193, at 75
(“Unfortunately, no single empirical representation [of capital asset pricing] ‘wins’, and the
quest for a simple, reliable and commonly accepted implementation of the fundamental
value equation continues.”); Nai-Fu Chen, Richard Roll & Stephen A. Ross, Economic
Forces and the Stock Market, 59 J. BUS. 383, 384 (1986) (“The theory has been silent,
however, about which events are likely to influence all assets. A rather embarrassing gap
exists between the theoretically exclusive importance of systematic ‘state variables’ and our
complete ignorance of their identity.”).
211. BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 206.
212. Id. at 191. Financiers often use “a broad market index such as the S&P 500” as a
proxy for the market index. See id. at 120 n.4.
213. Id. at 206.
214. Id.
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This modern strain of research has led to the development of multifactor
asset pricing models, which “allow for several systematic factors . . . [to]
provide better descriptions of security returns.” 215 It is under these
multifactor models that priced risk—in this context, synonymous with
systematic risk 216—becomes relevant. 217
Although debate continues as a general matter as to which risks should
be factored into asset pricing models as priced risks, several articles from
applied financial literature have identified political risk as one such type of
priced risk. 218 This author proposes that Jurisdictional Risk should be
analyzed as a form of priced political risk.
Unfortunately, academics have not reached agreement on the definition
of “political risk.” 219 In light of a lacking academic consensus, this paper
adopts that definition of “political risk” used by The PRS Group (PRS), “[a]
leading organization in the field” of quantitative political risk analytics. 220
In determining a country’s political risk rating, PRS analyzes a country’s
“government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile,
215. Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
216. See, e.g., id. at 212, 212 n.15 (indicating that priced risk factors are those “that
concern a large segment of investors” and suggesting that they include risks that cannot “be
diversified away”); Cochrane & Culp, supra note 193, at 65 (“A central and classic idea in
asset pricing is that only systematic risk generates a premium.”); cf. Chen, Roll & Ross,
supra note 210, at 383 (“The general conclusion of theory is that an additional component of
long-run return is required and obtained whenever a particular asset is influenced by
systematic economic news and that no extra reward can be earned by (needlessly) bearing
diversifiable risk.”).
217. See BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 212.
218. See Geert Bekaert & Campbell R. Harvey, Research in Emerging Markets Finance:
Looking to the Future, 3 EMERGING M KTS. REV. 429, 443 (2002) (“[P]olitical risk is priced in
many emerging markets.”) (citations omitted); Enrico C. Perotti & Pieter van Oijen,
Privatization, Political Risk and Stock Market Development in Emerging Economies, 20 J.
OF INT’L MONEY & FIN. 43, 47 (2001) (“[I]t seems that political risk is a priced factor for
which investors are rewarded and that it strongly affects the local cost of equity, which may
have implications for growth.”); cf. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Vojislav Maksimovic, Law,
Finance, and Firm Growth, 53 J. FIN. 2107, 2114 (1998) (“[F]irms may be able to
compensate for the absence of specific legal protections by altering the provisions of
contracts. It is much harder to compensate for systemic failures of the legal system.”).
219. See, e.g., Stephen J. Kobrin, Political Risk: A Review and Reconsideration, 10 J.
INT’L BUS. STUD. 67, 67-68 (1979) (surveying the financial literature to identify at least six
definitions of “political risk” and criticizing such literature for failing to “provide an analytic
framework which can adequately contribute—in either a taxonomic or an operational
sense—to improved practice”).
220. BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 621. See generally PRS GROUP, http://www.
prsgroup.com (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
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internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religious
tensions, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and
bureaucratic quality.” 221
In particular, Jurisdictional Risk would seemingly be captured by PRS’s
political risk components of bureaucracy quality, 222 cross-border conflict, 223
ethnic tensions, 224 external conflict, 225 investment profile, 226 and law and
order. 227 Although it might be difficult to firmly place Jurisdictional Risk in
any one of these subcategories of political risk, it seems clear that
Jurisdictional Risk falls somewhere within PRS’s definition of “political
risk.” Therefore, disagreements and ambiguities in the financial literature
notwithstanding, one could rely on syllogism to conclude that because
Jurisdictional Risk is a political risk, 228 and because political risk is a priced
risk, 229 Jurisdictional Risk must therefore be a priced risk.
If Jurisdictional Risk thus requires compensation of Investors in the form
of a risk premium, this finding would have significant implications for
221. Guide to Data Variables, PRS GROUP, http://epub.prsgroup.com/list-of-all-variabledefinitions (last visited Mar. 4, 2016); see also ICRG Methodology, PRS GROUP,
https://www.prsgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/icrgmethodology.pdf (last visited
Mar. 4, 2016) (detailing quantitative methodology for PRS’s International Country Risk
Guide).
222. Guide to Data Variables, supra note 221 (defining “Bureaucracy Quality” as the
“[i]nstitutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy” and indicating that bureaucratic
“autonom[y] from political pressure” signifies diminished risk).
223. Id. (defining “Cross-border Conflict” as “[a]ctual or potential conflict with another
nation state . . . which can range in severity from cross-border armed conflict and incursion
to territorial claims subject to . . . litigation”).
224. Id. (defining “Ethnic Tensions” as “[a] measure of the degree of tension attributable
to . . . national . . . divisions”).
225. Id. (indicating that “External Conflict” includes “Foreign Pressures,” which is
defined as “[a]ctual or potential risk posed by pressures brought to bear on the government
by one or more foreign states to force a change of policy”).
226. Id. (defining “Investment Profile” as “[a] measure of the factors affecting the risk to
investment that are not covered by other . . . risk components”).
227. Id. (indicating that “[t]he ‘law’ subcomponent” of “Law & Order” considers “the
strength and impartiality of the legal system”).
228. See generally id.
229. See Bekaert & Harvey, supra note 218, at 443 (“[P]olitical risk is priced in many
emerging markets.”) (citations omitted); Perotti & Oijen, supra note 218, at 47 (“[I]t seems
that political risk is a priced factor for which investors are rewarded and that it strongly
affects the local cost of equity, which may have implications for growth.”); cf. DemirgüçKunt & Maksimovic, supra note 218, at 2114 (“[F]irms may be able to compensate for the
absence of specific legal protections by altering the provisions of contracts. It is much harder
to compensate for systemic failures of the legal system.”).
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public policy. Indeed, to analogize, antifraud liability under U.S. securities
regulation appears to be at least partially premised on the notion that
fraudulent financial disclosures pose a priced risk for investors. 230
Securities regulation assumes that antifraud liability is necessary to prevent
investors from “discounting the amount that they are willing to pay for
securities to reflect the risk of fraud,” which would lead to an increased cost
of capital for firms that issue securities were fraud unregulated such that it
could become a systematic threat. 231
If Jurisdictional Risk similarly proves to be a priced risk, Investors who
seek to sell capital to tribal parties also need regulatory protection—
namely, in the form of enhanced jurisdictional certainty to reduce litigation
costs. Absent such protections—so long as Jurisdictional Risk is left
unchecked—Investors “will demand meaningful risk premiums to bear
exposure to th[at] source[] of risk.” 232
The requirement of a Jurisdictional Risk premium would impede growth
of tribal economies by increasing the cost of capital. 233 Indeed, investors’
first consideration in deciding whether to invest is the amount of risk
premium “offered to compensate for the risk involved in investing.” 234
Owing to risk aversion, would-be investors will refuse to invest in a
portfolio of risky assets (such as the theoretical basket of all tribal
investment assets) absent a positive, nonzero risk premium and will
otherwise “shy away” from risky portfolios that have a low ratio of “risk
premium relative to risk.” 235 In fact, when “risk premiums fall, . . .
relatively more risk-averse investors will pull their funds out of the
risky . . . portfolio, placing them instead in the risk-free asset” 236—which,

230. See generally STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES
(Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 4th ed., 2015).
231. See id. (“[F]raud may influence how investors direct their capital. . . . [D]iscounting
means that publicly-traded firms will face a higher cost of capital if capital markets are
infected by fraud.”).
232. See BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 212; see also id. at 195 (“[W]e would expect
the reward, or the risk premium on individual assets, to depend on the risk an individual
asset contributes to the overall portfolio.”); Cochrane & Culp, supra note 193, at 65
(indicating that “asset prices are equal to the expected cashflow discounted at the risk-free
rate, plus a risk premium”).
233. Cf. BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 195 (indicating that CAPM’s required rate of
return is the rate “that will compensate investors for the risk of that investment, as well as for
the time value of money”).
234. See id. at 119.
235. See id. at 120.
236. Id. at 192-93.
AND ANALYSIS 198
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in this instance, would constitute anything but tribal investments subject to
Jurisdictional Risk.
This theory, of course, needs empirical testing, especially considering the
developing nature of research into both political risk and priced risk.
However, research into tribal economics seems consistent with the notion
that Jurisdictional Risk is a priced risk. A 2003 article from the South
Dakota Business Review, for example, indicates “a long history of both
private and tribal enterprises that have failed on [South Dakota’s]
reservations,” attributing such failure to the absence of a “rule of law.” 237
The South Dakota Bankers Association (the “Association”) cited that
study in a 2014 amicus curiae brief supporting a pending petition for
certiorari, extrapolating the findings to conclude that non-tribal businesses
“limit the amount of business they do on-reservations . . . because the risk
associated with not knowing the rules before the game begins simply
outweighs the potential economic benefit.” 238 The Association, though
focused specifically on the expansion of tribal jurisdiction, articulated
concerns regarding added “uncertainty and [non-tribal] reluctance [to
invest], the net result of which will be continued economic hardship for
those living on and near Indian reservations.” 239
The Association’s findings are consistent not only with the concepts of
home bias and capital asset pricing, but also with general principles of
international business strategy. In fact, “[i]nstability in a national
government creates numerous problems, including economic risks and
uncertainty created by government regulations; the existence of many,
possibly conflicting, legal authorities; and the potential nationalization of
private assets.” 240 Stabilization of tribal governments—or at least the
clarification of their judicial authority—however, is likely to draw
additional non-tribal investment. 241
237. Brown & Selk, supra note 101, at 14 (emphasis omitted) (identifying un-honored
contracts and nepotism as examples of breaches of typical Anglo-American law that prevent
the “attracting [of] outside capital and the process of development and growth that is so
desperately needed on the American Indian reservations in South Dakota”).
238. Brief for South Dakota Bankers Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
supra note 103. See generally Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co.,
554 U.S. 316 (2008).
239. Brief for South Dakota Bankers Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
supra note 103, at 2.
240. See, e.g., HOSKISSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 288.
241. See id. (“Changes in government policies can dramatically influence the
attractiveness of direct foreign investment.”); see also Brown & Selk, supra note 101, at 13
(“One of the first requisites of a successful economy is good governance. This . . . provides
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Thus, considering the great deal of uncertainty and risk surrounding the
case-by-case application of the canon of tribal civil jurisdiction, it seems
likely that potential Indian Country Investors are shifting the costs of
heightened Jurisdictional Risk to tribal parties via risk premiums 242 or are
routing their funds elsewhere 243—to the detriment of tribal economies.
IV. Solutions
Solutions to the pervasive uncertainty of tribal civil jurisdiction currently
exist, though each existing solution faces significant flaws. Suits
challenging jurisdiction in state and federal court are perhaps the most
obvious, though suit is not a helpful option for preventing jurisdictional
controversy, and the unpredictability of judicial opinions has created most
of the uncertainty in the first place. But, where lawsuits become necessary,
litigants and courts should look to the Ninth Circuit’s Water Wheel
Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance for clarity and guidance. 244
Sophisticated parties also have the proactive option to contractually
mitigate Jurisdictional Risk with forum selection and arbitration clauses.
These clauses may not always be practically available to less-sophisticated
parties, however, and are not always fully reliable in the field of tribal
law. 245
Therefore, because existing legal mechanisms fail to fully remedy the
inherent uncertainties of tribal civil jurisdiction, a delegation of rulemaking
authority to the Bureau of Indian Affairs—with a policy of maximizing
clarity and predictability in the law—is likely desirable.

the stability which encourages the inflow of investment capital in response to profit
opportunities which is necessary for economic growth.”).
242. See BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 193 (explaining that investors require an
increased risk premium in response to increased systematic risk).
243. See id. at 120 (explaining that risk aversion causes investors to “shy away” from
risky portfolios that offer inadequate risk premiums).
244. 642 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2012).
245. See generally Attorney’s Process & Investigation Servs., Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of
Miss. in Iowa, 609 F.3d 927, 932, 946 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding a contract between an ousted
tribal leader putatively on behalf of the tribe and a service provider invalid on grounds of
capacity, thus barring suit on grounds of tribal sovereign immunity and thus barring
enforcement of an arbitration agreement).
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A. A Suggested Framework for Federal or State Suits to Challenge Tribal
Jurisdiction
A federal or state suit to challenge tribal jurisdiction remains the most
obvious solution to the uncertainties surrounding tribal civil jurisdiction,
but it fails to truly resolve the problem of diminished non-tribal investment
in tribal economies. Given that suit is among the least proactive and most
delay-filled solutions available, this option will fail to encourage Investors
currently avoiding tribal investments due to Jurisdictional Risk 246 because
the party must make the initial investment and be sued in tribal court before
suit to challenge tribal jurisdiction becomes an option. 247
Lawsuits thus largely fail to address the chilling effects imposed upon
Investors that lead to excessively conservative, risk-averse behavior with
respect to investing in Indian Country. This is because suits that are not
granted certiorari for United States Supreme Court review will have
minimal prospective effect, will create additional circuit splits and
additional confusion, and will perhaps defeat expectation interests in having
retroactive effects upon parties to the suit. Additional shortcomings of
relying on federal lawsuits to challenge the current canon of tribal
jurisdiction include an inconsistent and underdeveloped doctrine,
substantial costs and delay to the parties who go through appeals in two
judicial systems, and the encouragement of judicially disfavored dilatory
tactics and excessive lawyering to increase attorney fees at cost to the
parties and the federal-state-tribal judicial system (the “Tripartite
Judiciary”). 248
Although suit does not pose a strong solution to these policy concerns, it
remains one of the few avenues available to Investors preferring to litigate
substantive claims in state or federal court under the current canon of tribal
civil jurisdiction. Lawsuits also provide additional benefits with respect to
resolving jurisdictional disputes in that they support tribal sovereignty and
the development of a tribe’s own rules of civil jurisdiction, and up-front
costs to the Tripartite Judiciary remain minimal, given no need for
246. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 322.
247. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992) (“[A] plaintiff
raising only a generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his
and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking
relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does
not state an Article III case or controversy [to achieve standing].”)
248. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94-95 (2009) (requiring that jurisdictional
rules be based on policies valuing “predictability,” cost savings and expedience,
“administrative simplicity,” and an avoidance of “greater litigation” and “strange results”).
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structural change or a substantial learning curve—although long-term costs
with respect to docket administration and judicial resources remain
substantial.
Despite these caveats, federal suit to challenge tribal jurisdiction has
been the driving force behind the development of tribal procedural law, and
this trend is likely to continue pending legislative action. In fact, the federal
judiciary’s struggle to articulate a modern workable analytical framework
for questions of tribal jurisdiction took at least fifty-two years—the length
of time between the foundational Williams case and the recently decided
Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance. 249 Unfortunately,
the Water Wheel parties did not file a petition for certiorari, 250 so the
clearest and most reasoned analysis on questions of tribal civil jurisdiction
remains binding only in the Ninth Circuit. Thus, other circuits and the
United States Supreme Court should endorse the case’s reasoning in future
appeals.
The strength of Water Wheel lies in its clear articulation of the general
requirements for tribal civil jurisdiction and its creation of a clear
dichotomy between subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction in
tribal courts. In contrast, many other foundational cases speak in
jurisdictional generalities, failing to make this crucial distinction that
implicates predictability and consistency in future adjudications. 251 Tribal
civil jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit explains, inheres in cases where a tribal
court may exercise concurrent subject matter and personal jurisdiction. 252
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Tribal subject matter jurisdiction, under Water Wheel, requires the
presence of both regulatory and adjudicative jurisdiction. 253 Regulatory
jurisdiction may be found in three circumstances, the first involving
occurrences on tribal-owned land and the second and third involving

249. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). See generally Water Wheel, 642 F.3d
802.
250. See generally Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 802.
251. Id. at 809. See generally Williams, 358 U.S. 217 (abstaining from mentioning either
personal or subject matter jurisdiction).
252. Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 809 (providing no citation to supporting authority).
253. Id.; see also Attorney’s Process & Investigation Servs., Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of
the Miss. in Iowa, 609 F.3d 927, 937-41 (8th Cir. 2010) (articulating the Eighth Circuit’s
framework for subject matter jurisdiction analysis); MacArthur v. San Juan County, 497
F.3d 1057, 1068-76 (10th Cir. 2007) (articulating the Tenth Circuit’s framework for subject
matter jurisdiction analysis).
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occurrences on non-tribal land. 254 Where the non-Indian’s transaction or
occurrence occurred on tribal-owned land, regulatory jurisdiction occurs as
a result of the tribe’s retained, inherent sovereignty so long as the incident
“interfered directly with” a tribe’s exclusionary authority and “competing
state interests” are not implicated. 255
Alternatively, regulatory jurisdiction may result from a non-Indian’s
transaction or occurrence on non-tribal land under Montana’s Commercial
Relationship Exception or Self-Governance Exception. 256
After finding regulatory jurisdiction, Water Wheel advises, courts must
inquire into the existence of adjudicatory jurisdiction. 257 Adjudicatory
jurisdiction is usually limited by the bounds of the tribe’s regulatory
jurisdiction. 258 Thus, although adjudicatory jurisdiction certainly cannot
exist in the absence of regulatory jurisdiction, the perhaps narrower bounds
of adjudicatory jurisdiction remain largely undetermined. 259
According to earlier Supreme Court precedent, questions of subject
matter jurisdiction also require “a careful examination of tribal sovereignty,
the extent to which that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or
diminished, as well as a detailed study of the relevant statutes, Executive
Branch policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or
judicial decisions.” 260

254. Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 814, 817.
255. Id. at 814. But see Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001) (holding that
Montana’s general rule that tribal courts lack civil jurisdiction over non-tribal parties applies
regardless of whether land is tribe-owned).
256. See Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 817 (“The tribe clearly had authority to regulate . . .
under Montana’s first exception and . . . under the second exception as well.”); see also
Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66.
257. See Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 814.
258. Id.; Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997) (“As to nonmembers . . . a
tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction[,] [a]bsent
congressional direction enlarging tribal-court jurisdiction.”).
259. See Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 814 (“The Supreme Court has not yet considered the
question of adjudicative authority where regulatory jurisdiction exists.”); see also Nevada v.
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358, 374 (2001) (stating that “the question whether a tribe’s
adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmember defendants equals its legislative jurisdiction”
remained unanswered as well).
260. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow, 471 U.S. 845, 855-56 (1985); see also
Attorney’s Process & Investigation Servs., Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of the Miss. in Iowa, 609
F.3d 927, 934 (8th Cir. 2010) (providing a slightly different articulation of the balancing test,
specifically considering the interests of non-Indians, but not specifying to which of the
several components of tribal civil jurisdiction this test applies).
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2. Personal Jurisdiction
Perhaps the greatest contribution of Water Wheel is that it is one of the
first and only cases on tribal civil jurisdiction to apply personal jurisdiction
analysis 261 according to the well-developed federal canon. 262
a) Tag Jurisdiction and Physical Presence
Citing Burnham v. Superior Court as authority for “tag” 263 and physical
presence personal jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit suggests that tribal
personal jurisdiction “exists over defendants physically present in the forum
state”—that is, on Indian-owned land. 264 The Water Wheel Court found that
tribal personal jurisdiction existed over the plaintiff challenging the tribal
court’s jurisdiction as a result of “[i]n-state personal service” and because
that plaintiff’s domicile lay on Indian-owned land—which “on its own
serves as a basis for personal jurisdiction.” 265
b) Minimum Contacts Analysis
In addition to Burnham’s tag and physical presence jurisdiction, the
court in Water Wheel went on to recognize a third basis of support for the
tribal court’s personal jurisdiction: minimum contacts analysis. 266 Under
International Shoe, a court may maintain personal jurisdiction over a party
outside the forum state where the court’s jurisdiction would “not offend
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” 267 Although far
beyond the scope of this comment, this basic rule of International Shoe
began a long line of personal jurisdiction precedent known as “minimum
contacts” analysis, under which “a defendant may be subjected to a

261. See Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 819 (“To exercise civil authority over a defendant, a
tribal court must have both personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction.”).
262. See generally Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
263. Linda J. Silberman, Reflections on Burnham v. Superior Court: Toward
Presumptive Rules of Jurisdiction and Implications for Choice of Law, 22 RUTGERS L. J.
569, 569 n.3 (1991) (“‘Tag’ jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction asserted over a defendant who
is physically served with process while physically present within the state . . . [T]he term
usually implies that the defendant is not a permanent resident or a domiciliary of the forum
state but is only temporarily physically present.”).
264. See Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 819 (citing Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604,
610 (1990)).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 819-20 (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
267. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940),
overruling recognized by Carson v. Brodin, 585 S.E.2d 491 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003)).
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judgment in personam, even if not present within the territory of the forum,
if the defendant has certain minimum contacts with the jurisdiction.” 268
Additional research regarding the integration of International Shoe into
the doctrine of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians is merited. Until
subsequent research and case law clarifies the analysis for challenges to
tribal civil jurisdiction, however, proactive parties may be better served by
careful contract drafting.
B. Contract Drafting as a Risk-Reduction Strategy
Many Investors and the tribal entities they transact with may easily and
with minimum additional transactional costs draft forum selection and
arbitration clauses into transactional documents to decrease jurisdictional
uncertainty.
While proactive drafting will help in many situations, in many others it
will not. This solution assumes that all parties are sophisticated and have
access to legal counsel and that all tribal-non-tribal agreements are
governed by contract. These assumptions are often violated, as
unsophisticated tribal-non-tribal transactions do occur, and Montana
demonstrates that tribal jurisdiction can be granted or denied on bases not
involving contracts. 269 Even where all of these assumptions hold true, tribal
law may not provide for reliable contract enforcement. 270
Thus, although careful drafting cannot provide a long-term or holistic
solution to the lacking clarity in the law of tribal civil jurisdiction, it can
provide some risk mitigation in the present.
1. Forum Selection Clauses
The enforcement 271 and validity 272 of forum selection clauses are often
governed by federal law, and such clauses are “prima facie valid” despite
268. 28 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 65:10 (Westlaw) (updated Dec. 2015).
269. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (providing for regulatory
jurisdiction under a first exception for “consensual relationships . . . through commercial
dealing . . . or other arrangements” and under a second exception for “conduct threaten[ing]
or . . . direct[ly] [a]ffect[ing] . . . the political integrity, the economic security, or the health
or welfare of the tribe”).
270. See, e.g., Brown & Selk, supra note 101, at 14 (“Unfortunately, the rule of law . . .
does not exist on a number of [South Dakota] reservations. Contracts . . . have not been
honored. . . . [C]hanges in tribal leadership have led to arbitrary violation of contracts which
has amounted to expropriation of private property.”).
271. See, e.g., Atlantic Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. District Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581
(2013) (indicating that the federal change of venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), is “the
appropriate provision to enforce the forum-selection clause in this case”); Stewart Org., Inc.
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an earlier tradition of judicial disfavor. 273 The contemporary Supreme Court
has articulated a policy of upholding forum selection clauses “in the light of
present-day commercial realities and expanding international trade.” 274
Therefore, a party seeking to strike forum selection clauses as unreasonable
must satisfy a “heavy burden of proof” in showing that the forum selection
clause poses obstacles “so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he
will . . . be deprived of his day in court.” 275 Factors demonstrating
unreasonableness include clauses seeking to transfer “local disputes [to] a
remote alien forum . . . to apply differing foreign law,” violation of “a
strong public policy” domestic to the suit’s originating form, contracts of
adhesion, and unforeseeable controversies or inconvenience. 276
The Supreme Court has indicated that it will also review forum selection
clauses for fundamental fairness. 277 In doing so, the Court will consider
whether the drafter was motivated by convenience or caprice, whether the
v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 25, 30 (1988) (affirming an Eleventh Circuit ruling that
“questions of venue in diversity actions are governed by federal law,” even where contrary
state law exists); id. at 31 (“[A] forum-selection clause . . . should receive neither dispositive
consideration (as respondent might have it) nor no consideration (as Alabama law might
have it), but rather the consideration for which Congress provided in § 1404(a). . . . This is
thus not a case in which state and federal rules ‘can exist side by side . . . each controlling its
own intended sphere of coverage without conflict.’”) (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,
446 U.S. 740, 752 (1980)).
272. See Matthew J. Sorenson, Enforcement of Forum-Selection Clauses in Federal
Court After Atlantic Marine, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2521, 2546 (2014) (“[T]he Supreme
Court [in Atlantic Marine] . . . left open the question of whether state or federal law governs
the validity of forum-selection clauses in diversity cases,” though “[m]any courts, even in
diversity cases, uncritically assume that since the enforcement of forum-selection clauses is
sometimes governed by federal law, the validity must also be a question of federal law.”).
273. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991), superseded in
part by statute, 46 U.S.C. § 183c (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 30509) (quoting The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), superseded in part by statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a)). But see Sorenson, supra note 272, at 2533 (indicating that Atlantic
Marine, 134 S. Ct. 568, “set[] aside the holding in The Bremen that forum clauses are prima
facie valid . . . [without] explicitly overruling it”).
274. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15, 17 (adjudicating “a freely negotiated international
commercial transaction between a German and an American corporation for towage of a
vessel”), superseded in part by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
275. Id. at 17-18, superseded in part by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
276. Id. at 15-18, superseded in part by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
277. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 587, 590, 595 (hearing an admiralty case and
specifically referencing “passage contracts” between American parties hailing from different
states), superseded in part by statute, 46 U.S.C. § 183c (current version at 46 U.S.C. §
30509).
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drafter committed fraud or overreaching, whether the non-drafting party
received notice, and whether the non-drafting party would be prejudiced in
refusing the contract. 278
Although the case did not involve tribal courts, Carnival Cruise Lines,
Inc. v. Shute demonstrates the liberality with which federal courts uphold
traditional forum selection clauses. 279 In Carnival, plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs.
Shute, of Washington, bought cruise tickets from Florida-headquartered
Carnival. 280 Carnival printed on the tickets a forum selection clause
requiring all suits be litigated in Florida. 281
After beginning the cruise in California and sailing into international
waters near Mexico, Mrs. Shute slipped and fell while touring the ship. 282
The couple subsequently sued in a Washington federal court, and Carnival
filed a motion for summary judgment relying on the plaintiffs’ failure to
observe the forum selection clause. 283
Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the forum selection clause. 284 The
Court implied that the routineness of a transaction and the actual bargaining
power of a plaintiff in a form contract is not a strong consideration under
fundamental fairness review so long as plaintiffs “were given notice of the
forum provision and . . . retained the option of rejecting the contract with
impunity.” 285
Rather, the Court subjugated plaintiffs’ lack of bargaining power to
several policy interests. 286 First, the Court cited Carnival’s “special interest”
in substantially reducing the locations in which it may be sued owing to its
wide geographic presence. 287 Second, the Court valued “dispelling any
confusion” regarding the appropriate forum and “sparing litigants the time
and expense of . . . determin[ing] the correct forum and conserving judicial
resources.” 288 Third, the Court valued the cost savings that have and will

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

See id. at 595.
See generally id.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 587-88.
Id. at 588.
Id.
Id. at 595, 597.
Id. at 595.
See id. at 593-94.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 593-94.
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continue to accrue to passengers as a result of decreased jurisdictional risk
to Carnival. 289
Despite the Supreme Court’s general support for traditional forum
selection clauses, there is much less agreement as to how courts should
handle forum selection clauses attempting to avoid tribal civil jurisdiction.
One scholar identifies at least four different approaches among federal and
state courts addressing the effects of such forum selection clauses, with
some jurisdictions deferring the matter to the discretion of tribal courts
under the tribal exhaustion doctrine. 290
Unfortunately, adherence to the tribal exhaustion doctrine contradicts the
very purpose of a forum selection clause: reducing cost and uncertainty
related to the appropriate jurisdiction for litigation. 291 The delay and
expense of the tribal exhaustion doctrine is particularly pronounced because
litigants seeking to challenge tribal civil jurisdiction must submit to
proceedings in lower and appellate tribal courts before challenging tribal
jurisdiction in federal courts. 292
In observance of the fact that forum-selection clauses are much less
effective in reducing Jurisdictional Risk when tribal courts are involved,
289. Id. at 594; see also The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972)
(“[M]uch uncertainty and possibly great inconvenience to both parties could arise if a suit
could be maintained in any jurisdiction . . . where the [parties] might happen to be found.
The elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to
both parties is an indispensable element in international trade, commerce, and contracting”),
superseded in part by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
290. See generally Buckman, supra note 7, § 14[a] (indicating that some courts have
“held that forum selection provisions in contracts between non-Indians and Indians or Indian
tribes eliminate the requirement of tribal exhaustion”); id. § 14[b] (indicating that some
courts have “held that forum selection provisions in contracts between non-Indians and
Indians or Indian tribes do not serve to remove the requirement of tribal exhaustion”); id. §
14[c] (indicating that some courts have “held that Indian parties may not waive the tribal
exhaustion requirement in contractual agreements with non-Indians”); id. § 14.5 (indicating
that some courts “recogniz[e] that tribal exhaustion requirements do not necessarily apply to
deprive federal courts of jurisdiction that is obtained concurrently with tribal jurisdiction
over matters involving contracts between tribe members and non-Indians”). See also supra
Section II.B.
291. Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure,
25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 51, 51-52 (1992) (“Forum-selection clauses . . . permit parties to
select a desirable, perhaps neutral, forum in which to litigate disputes. Such planning . . .
obviat[es] a potentially costly struggle at the outset of litigation over jurisdiction and
venue.”).
292. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 17 (1987); see also supra Section II.B.
For exhaustive coverage of the tribal exhaustion doctrine, see generally Buckman, supra
note 7.
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parties may not be able to rely as heavily on this device in the tribal context.
Therefore, parties may desire additional or alternative methods of
mitigating Jurisdictional Risk.
2. Arbitration Clauses
Addressing policy and business concerns similar to those addressed by
forum selection clauses, arbitration clauses represent another mechanism by
which parties might seek to create certainty. The Supreme Court has
recognized that the United States “cannot have trade and commerce in
world markets . . . exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and
resolved in our courts.”293 As such, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
provides liberal support for traditional arbitration clauses. 294 In fact, except
“upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract,” an arbitration clause “shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable.” 295
A party seeking to enforce an arbitration clause may seek an injunction
compelling arbitration pursuant to the clause from a federal court that
would have federal question or diversity jurisdiction over the agreement but
for the arbitration clause. 296 The Act requires that federal courts issue such
an injunction where agreement formation and performance are not at
issue. 297
Where issues of formation or performance must be resolved, however,
the Supreme Court has held that a reviewing court must first search for an

293. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974) (quoting The Bremen, 407
U.S. at 9).
294. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (“[The FAA’s]
purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had
existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place
arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”); see also Volt Info. Sci. v.
Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989) (“[T]he federal policy
is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to
arbitrate.”). See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012).
295. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
296. See id. § 4 (“A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another
to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district
court which, save for such agreement, would have [subject matter] jurisdiction under Title
28 . . . for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such
agreement.”).
297. See id. (“[U]pon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or
the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the
parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”).
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agreement to arbitrate under the Federal Arbitration Act.298 The scope of an
arbitration agreement is delineated by the language of an agreement, but in
the presence of ambiguity, the arbitration clause will be construed so as to
favor arbitration. 299 Where the FAA applies, courts presume an arbitration
clause is valid even when parties allege the agreement as a whole is
unenforceable because the Supreme Court has ruled that arbitration clauses
are severable components from an otherwise unenforceable contract. 300
Upon finding a valid arbitration clause, a reviewing court must then
“consider[] whether legal constraints external to the parties’ agreement
foreclosed the arbitration.” 301 In assessing enforceability of arbitration
clauses, courts consider “concerns of international comity, respect for the
capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need
of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of
disputes,” with these factors sometimes trumping “a contrary result . . . in a
domestic context.” 302 It would appear that courts must also consider rules
affecting the broader category of forum selection clauses, as the Supreme
Court has held that arbitration agreements are, “in effect, a specialized kind
of forum-selection clause.” 303
Furthermore, where a party seeks judicial confirmation of an arbitral
award, a federal court has discretion to vacate the award upon finding fraud
in achieving the award, arbitrator “partiality or corruption,” arbitrator
misconduct, ultra vires arbitrator action, or the lack of a “mutual, final, and
definite award.” 304
Despite these general rules, strong federal support for arbitration clauses
loses significant force when tribal courts are involved, as some federal
courts analyze arbitration clauses similarly to forum selection clauses,
298. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626
(1985); see also Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 297 (2010).
299. See E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289, 294 (2002); see also Moses
H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) (“[A]ny doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether
the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”).
300. See Granite Rock, 561 U.S. at 298-99 (noting that this presumption does not apply
where the arbitration clause or contract formation—as opposed to contract enforceability—
are at issue).
301. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628.
302. Id. at 629.
303. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974).
304. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2012); see also id. § 11 (articulating scenarios in which a
federal court may modify an arbitral award).
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demanding adherence to the tribal exhaustion doctrine. 305 Thus, again,
litigants seeking to challenge tribal civil jurisdiction must submit to
proceedings in lower and appellate tribal courts before challenging tribal
jurisdiction in federal courts. 306 Therefore, the threat of the exhaustion
doctrine significantly reduces the effectiveness of forum selection and
arbitration clauses in tribal-non-tribal commerce.
3. Drafting Remains an Imperfect Solution to the Labyrinthine System of
Tribal Civil Jurisdiction
The exhaustion doctrine is not the only shortcoming of traditional
drafting strategies when applied in tribal contexts. For example, Water
Wheel and Montana demonstrate that regulatory jurisdiction may be
established on several grounds independent of contractual relationships,
thus creating multiple situations in which the availability of drafting cannot
remedy the risks surrounding tribal civil jurisdiction—especially for
unsophisticated parties or those lacking access to counsel.
Water Wheel held that a tribe’s retained, inherent sovereignty alone is
sufficient grounds for regulatory jurisdiction over a non-Indian’s (perhaps
noncontractual) conduct on tribal-owned land when the conduct “interfered
directly with” a tribe’s exclusionary authority and “competing state
interests” are not implicated. 307
Alternatively, regulatory jurisdiction may result from a non-Indian’s
transaction or occurrence on non-tribal land under either Montana
exception. 308 Even Montana’s Commercial Relationship Exception might
not require a contract, specifying that tribal regulation of non-Indians may
result where the regulated party voluntarily completed “commercial
dealing . . . or other arrangements” with a tribal entity. 309 Montana’s SelfGovernance Exception also allows for regulatory jurisdiction outside of
contract-based relationships as a result of “retain[ed] inherent power”
where the non-Indian’s transaction or occurrence “threatens or has some

305. See generally Buckman, supra note 7, § 15.
306. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 17 (1987); see also supra Section II.B.
For exhaustive coverage of the tribal exhaustion doctrine, see generally Buckman, supra
note 7.
307. Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 814 (9th Cir.
2011).
308. See id. at 817 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (“The
tribe clearly had authority to regulate . . . under Montana’s first exception and . . . under the
second exception as well.”).
309. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added).
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direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health
or welfare of the tribe.” 310
Furthermore, even where regulatory jurisdiction stems from a contractual
relationship, enforcement of contracts between a tribal and a non-tribal
party appears to be a developing and sometimes troublesome area of law. 311
Contracts with tribes, for example, are governed by federal statute and
Department of Interior regulation. 312 Where such a contract was not validly
formed, any forum selection or arbitration clauses become moot. 313
Attorney’s Process and Investigation Services, Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of
the Mississippi in Iowa demonstrates the hazards of relying on
Jurisdictional Risk-reduction clauses and enforcing contracts between tribal
and non-tribal parties in general, as this case’s non-tribal party was not even
entitled to rely on a federal Bureau of Indian Affairs proclamation of which
party was governing a tribe so as to have contracting authority.
In Attorney’s Process, the Eighth Circuit held invalid a contract, and its
contained arbitration clause, between a non-tribal casino security
corporation and the Sac and Fox Tribe owing to insufficient contracting
authority in connection with a tribal coup d’etat. 314 A dissident contingency
vying for control of the tribe ousted the incumbent tribal council chairman
from tribal facilities both physically and by special election, though an
administrative delay left the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
continuing to recognize the incumbent’s authority. 315 When federal courts
310. Id. at 566.
311. See, e.g., Brown & Selk, supra note 101, at 14 (“Unfortunately, the rule of law . . .
does not exist on a number of [South Dakota] reservations. Contracts . . . have not been
honored. . . . [C]hanges in tribal leadership have led to arbitrary violation of contracts which
has amounted to expropriation of private property.”).
312. 25 U.S.C. § 81 (2012).
313. See Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 302 (2010) (“[A]
court may submit to arbitration ‘only those disputes . . . that the parties have agreed to
submit.’”); see also id. at 299 (“[C]ourts should order arbitration of a dispute only where the
court is satisfied that neither the formation of the parties’ arbitration agreement nor . . . its
enforceability or applicability to the dispute is in issue.”) But see id. at 298-99 (“[A]t least in
cases governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, courts must treat the arbitration clause as
severable from the contract in which it appears, and thus apply the clause to all disputes
within its scope ‘[u]nless the [validity] challenge is to the arbitration clause itself’ or the
party ‘disputes the formation of [the] contract.’”) (citations omitted).
314. Attorney’s Process & Investigation Servs., Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of the Miss. in
Iowa, 609 F.3d 927, 930-32, 945-46 (8th Cir. 2010); see also Wandrie-Harjo v. ChiefBoswell, No. CIV–11–171–F, 2011 WL 7807743 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 15, 2011) (documenting
a governance dispute of the Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma).
315. Attorney’s Process, 609 F.3d at 930-32.
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refused to decide the governance dispute, the incumbent chairman
contracted with the security company “[p]utatively acting as council
chairman” despite having lost the special election. 316 The contract,
including an arbitration clause, called for the security company to search for
evidence of illegal activity related to the coup and to perform security
services related to the tribe’s temporarily closed casino. 317
Approximately four months into the contract, with the BIA continuing to
recognize the incumbent as the rightful tribal leader, weapon-carrying
security company personnel stormed dissident-occupied tribal buildings to
retrieve “confidential information . . . related to the Tribe’s gaming
operations and finances.” 318 In connection with this event, the newly elected
dissidents sued the security company in tribal court for various tort claims,
including a conversion claim related to payment of the company’s service
fees from the tribal treasury. 319 Considering the tribal courts validated the
dissident chairman’s governing authority owing to his successful special
election, the tribal courts found the incumbent chairman was unable to bind
the tribe in the security services contract.320
In response, the security company sued in federal court seeking to
enforce the arbitration clause it secured with the incumbent chairman. 321
After a fairly nuanced procedural history leading to an indeterminate Eighth
Circuit review also of the tribal court’s subject matter jurisdiction, 322 the
Eighth Circuit proceeded to review the validity of the arbitration clause. 323
The Eighth Circuit ruled that tribal law, not federal law, applies to tribal
leadership disputes. 324 As such, the federal BIA’s validation of tribal
leadership cannot bind tribes, and leadership disputes must be resolved by
the tribes alone. 325 It thus follows that only tribal courts can decide whether
an ousted incumbent leader had power to bind the tribe by contract. 326 Thus,

316. Id. at 932.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 933.
321. Id. at 932-33.
322. Id. at 941 (“[A] remand is necessary so that the district court may consider the
applicability of the first Montana exception . . . .”).
323. Id. at 942-43.
324. Id. at 943.
325. See id.
326. Id.
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the Eighth Circuit held the contract as a whole, including its arbitration
clause and waiver of tribal sovereign immunity, to be invalid. 327
The court was not persuaded by the security company’s policy
arguments that depriving non-tribal businesses of the ability to trust
“federal agency recognition of a particular tribal government could interfere
with the provision of services to Indian tribes.” 328 Although the company
was likely correct, the court found the arguments legally “irrelevant” due to
the nonexistence of “congressional intent to authorize the encroachment
upon tribal sovereignty.” 329
C. The Need for Additional Administrative Research Under the Existing
Regulatory Scheme
In recognition of the fact that Investors’ only self-help options—federal
lawsuits and drafting to reduce risk—suffer from significant flaws that are
detrimental to tribes, Investors, and the Tripartite Judiciary, Congress
should step in to provide additional rules and policies to guide the largely
blind judiciary’s hand. This is especially true given that the federal
government bears “responsibility . . . for the protection and preservation of
Indian tribes . . . through the endorsement of treaties, and the enactment of
other laws, including laws that provide for the exercise of administrative
authorities.” 330
Luckily, the federal government’s unique relationship with the tribes
leaves this most flexible of options available. 331 In fact, the Indian
Commerce Clause, federal-tribal treaties, and “inherent” federal authority
provide Congress with “plenary and exclusive” authority over the tribes. 332
This allows Congress to “enact legislation that both restricts, and in turn,
relaxes . . . restrictions on tribal sovereign authority.” 333
Fortunately, the existing statutory and regulatory scheme is already at
least partially equipped to tackle this obstacle. Although Congress has not
expressly delegated regulation of tribal civil jurisdiction to an
administrative body, it has seemingly provided the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 2, extremely broad regulatory jurisdiction
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

Id. at 945.
Id.
Id.
25 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(5) (2012).
See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563 (1981).
MacArthur v. San Juan County, 497 F.3d 1057, 1068 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and quoting United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200-01 (2004)).
333. Id. (quoting Lara, 541 U.S. at 202).
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over “the management of all Indian affairs and of all matters arising out of
Indian relations.” 334
More explicit and modern statutes have since created niche
administrative bodies specializing in tribal justice and commerce. Congress
created the Office of Tribal Justice Support (OTJS) as a unit of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs, “to further the development, operation, and enhancement
of tribal justice systems and Courts of Indian Offenses.” 335 The office,
although bearing regulatory authority over Courts of Indian Offenses 336—
administrative entities not to be confused with tribal courts 337—has no
regulatory authority over tribal courts. 338 With respect to tribal courts, the
Office of Tribal Justice Support is merely empowered to “conduct
research,” “[p]romote cooperation” among judicial systems, and “provide
technical assistance and training.” 339
In looking to tribal commerce, on the other hand, Congress created the
Office of Native American Business Development (ONABD), a unit of the
Department of Commerce, 340 to promote:
!
!
!
!
!
!

Business development and cross-border transactions;
“private investment in the economies of Indian tribes”;
“long-range sustained growth” of tribal economies;
tribal poverty reduction;
“a higher standard of living on Indian reservations”; and
tribal “political self-determination.” 341

334. 25 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); see also id. § 9 (“The President may prescribe such
regulations as he may think fit for carrying into effect the various provisions of any act
relating to Indian affairs.”).
335. 25 U.S.C. § 3611(a) (2012).
336. See id. § 3611(c)(5).
337. See 25 C.F.R. § 11.102 (West, Westlaw through July 9, 2015) (“It is the purpose
of . . . this part to provide adequate machinery for the administration of justice for Indian
tribes in those areas . . . where tribes retain jurisdiction over Indians that is exclusive of State
jurisdiction but where tribal courts have not been established . . . .”).
338. See 25 U.S.C. § 3611(d) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed or construed to
authorize the Office to impose justice standards on Indian tribes.”); id. § 3631(1), (3)
(“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to . . . encroach upon . . . the inherent sovereign
authority of each tribal government to determine the role of the tribal justice system; . . . [or]
impair the rights of each tribal government to determine the nature of its own legal
system.”).
339. Id. § 3611(c)(2)-(4), (e)(1).
340. 25 U.S.C. § 4303(a)(1) (2012).
341. Id. § 4301(b)(1)-(6).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol40/iss1/5

No. 1]

COMMENTS

181

Although Congress granted the office no express authority to issue
regulations, it tasked the office with “provid[ing] . . . financial and technical
assistance . . . [to spur] economic development on Indian lands,”
“coordinat[ing] Federal programs relating to Indian economic
development . . . [with] any such program of the Department of the
Interior,” and “any [other] activity . . . that is related to the development of
appropriate markets.” 342 Congress requires the office to prioritize projects
“foster[ing] long-term stable economies of Indian tribes.” 343
Because the ONABD’s enabling act requires it to “coordinate Federal
programs relating to Indian economic development . . . [with] any such
program of the Department of the Interior,” 344 it should immediately begin
a research cooperative with the Bureau of Indian Affair’s OTJS, as this is
ultimately a subunit of the Department of the Interior. 345 The two offices
should perform empirical and social science research to supplement the
largely theoretical and anecdotal evidence of a link between uncertainty in
the canon of tribal civil jurisdiction, decreased non-tribal investments in
Indian Country, and alleged non-tribal discrimination against Indians in
transactions. This data should be gathered with an ultimate goal of
producing a cost-benefit analysis to support much needed legislative—or
perhaps administrative—balancing of the apparently conflicting policies of
tribal judicial sovereignty over non-Indians and tribal economic
development. A rebalancing, or even mere clarification, of these policies
would improve predictability and drive non-tribal investments in Indian
Country far into the future 346—and thus this research cooperative should
qualify as action that the ONABD must prioritize. 347
Reporting of the offices’ findings should not require drastic structural or
logistical changes in the existing administrative framework because the
ONABD’s enabling act already requires annual reporting to the Senate

342. Id. § 4303(b)(1)-(3)(g).
343. Id. § 4303(b)(5)(B); see also id. § 4304(e)(2) (calling for prioritization of projects
leading to “long-term stable international markets for Indian goods and services”).
344. See id. § 4303(b)(2) (specifying “shall coordinate”).
345. See 25 U.S.C. § 3611(a) (2012) (“There is hereby established within the Bureau [of
Indian Affairs] the Office of Tribal Justice Support.”); 25 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“There shall be
in the Department of the Interior a Commissioner of Indian Affairs . . . .”).
346. See HOSKISSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 288 (“Changes in government policies can
dramatically influence the attractiveness of direct foreign investment.”).
347. See 25 U.S.C. § 4303(b)(5)(B) (specifying that the Office of Native American
Business Development “shall give priority to activities that . . . foster long-term stable
economies of Indian tribes”).
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Committee on Indian Affairs and the House Committee on Resources to
fuel legislative initiatives. 348
D. Congress Should Extend the Regulatory Authority of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs to Include Regulatory Jurisdiction over Tribal Civil
Jurisdiction
Although Congress could merely allow the ONABD and OTJS to
perform fact-finding functions and act directly upon those facts at its own
initiative, Congress has remained silent on the issue of tribal civil
jurisdiction over non-members through the present, despite the fact that
courts’ repeated recognition of Congress’s plenary power suggests a desire
for additional guidance. 349 Furthermore, “commentators often agree that
adjudicating under unclear judicial precedents is so problematic that both
tribes and states might prefer some type of jurisdiction allocation.” 350 Since
additional legislative guidance would likely add clarity to the legislatively
unmoored doctrine of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members, and thus
increase predictability for Investors, Congress should prioritize increasing
the attractiveness of tribal markets and alleviate the socioeconomic ills
facing one of the most disadvantaged demographics in the United States. 351
Considering Congress’s longstanding silence—as well as the BIA’s
subject matter expertise, 352 more-direct relationship with tribes, 353 and
348. See id. § 4306(a)-(b) (requiring annual reporting on “any recommendations for
legislation . . . necessary to carry out sections 4303 through 4305 of this title”).
349. See, e.g., Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 17 (1987) (“Congress
undoubtedly has the power to limit tribal court jurisdiction.”); Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. v.
Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 853 (1985) (“[T]he power of the Federal Government
over the Indian tribes is plenary.”); Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission
Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 787 n.30 (1984) (“[I]t is clear that all aspects of Indian sovereignty
are subject to defeasance by Congress . . . .”); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 562
(1981) (“If Congress had wished to extend tribal jurisdiction [over hunting and fishing] to
lands owned by non-Indians, it could easily have done so by incorporating in [18 U.S.C.] §
1165 the definition of ‘Indian country’ in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 . . . .”); see also Plains
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 340 (2008) (although a
formalist opinion, suggesting normative concerns regarding “the desirability of . . .
regulation” barring transactional discrimination against Native Americans).
350. Nakai, supra note 151, at 685-86 (noting that “many tribal-state agreements already
exist”).
351. 25 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(8) (2012) (“Native Americans suffer higher rates of
unemployment, poverty, poor health, substandard housing, and associated social ills than
those of any other group in the United States.”).
352. 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.6 (5th ed. 2010)
(“Members of Congress . . . lack the expertise necessary to understand the implications of
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additional insulation from political pressure 354—the legislature should
charge the BIA with regulating tribal civil jurisdiction. The BIA has
existing research and operational support from the OTJS, and the OTJS is
already highly experienced in “[o]verse[ing] the continuing operations of
the Courts of Indian Offenses” and in “[p]romot[ing] cooperation and
coordination among tribal justice systems and the Federal and State
judiciary systems.” 355 It should be noted the bureau has managed to contain
its own civil jurisdiction regulations for Courts of Indian Offenses to a mere
two regulations, each less than one page long, 356 all the while monitoring
and attempting to maintain consistency with Supreme Court precedent on
civil jurisdiction in the sister tribal courts. 357 In light of the need for
additional research on this issue and the foreseeable need for ongoing
management and adaptations to the regulatory framework, this “is precisely

the thousands of policy decisions government must make annually. . . . Given its cognitive
limitations, Congress wisely chooses to delegate most policy decisions to expert bodies that
can react rapidly to new developments and to new understandings in their areas of
expertise.”); cf. 7 West’s Fed. Admin. Prac. § 7924 (Westlaw) (updated July 2015) (“One
compelling justification for the administrative process is the need for ‘expertise.’ . . .
[relative to a] generalist court . . . .”).
353. See 1 Admin. L. & Prac. § 2:37 (3d ed.) (Westlaw) (updated Feb. 2015) (“Still a
dominant notion in administrative law is flexibility. . . . Administrative law demands that the
procedures should be designed . . . to best and most efficiently carry out the specific
decisionmaking task”); 7 West's Fed. Admin. Prac. § 7302 (Westlaw) (“[R]esponsiveness to
the prescribed goals of the various programs and those of government in general . . . assures
that the administrative system serves society and thereby all the individuals directly or
indirectly affected.”).
354. PIERCE, supra note 352, § 2.6 (“In an important class of cases, a multimember body
cannot make a choice among policy options without violating principles of fairness and
majority rule. . . . In such circumstances, Congress’ only choice is between an indeterminate
outcome (delegation of broad authority to an agency) and a determinate outcome that is
dictated by a minority with the power to determine the sequence of votes on the competing
alternatives.”) (citations omitted); cf. Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial
Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503, 504-05 (2000) (“The Federal Reserve Board has
demonstrated that if Congress provides broad delegation of authority to a singular agency
with a high degree of political independence, then effective regulation is likely, free of
special interest influence and of transitory political forces having less than rational
agendas.”).
355. 25 U.S.C. § 3611(c)(3)-(5) (2012).
356. See 25 C.F.R. §§ 11.116, 11.118 (2008).
357. See, e.g., Law and Order on Indian Reservations, 73 Fed. Reg. 39857-01, 39857
(July 11, 2008) (changing § 11.116(a)(2) to “compl[y] with Supreme Court rulings on tribal
jurisdiction”).
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the sort of intricate, labor-intensive task for which delegation to an expert
body is especially appropriate.” 358
Although the regulatory history indicates that the Bureau of Indian
Affairs relies on its facially boundless grant of authority under 25 U.S.C. §
2 to establish Courts of Indian Offenses 359—and the Tenth Circuit has
previously upheld bureau regulations creating a Court of Indian Offenses
pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 2360—the scope of authority courts are willing to
uphold under this statute seems to be unsettled. 361 Furthermore, the
practically unbounded statute itself may raise challenges under the
nondelegation doctrine. 362
Therefore, the uncertainty surrounding 25 U.S.C. § 2—the best existing
statutory support for this comment’s suggested BIA regulations—militates
in favor of Congress drafting a new enabling statute conforming to
nondelegation doctrine best practices.
1. The Statute Should Comply with the Nondelegation Doctrine
The Supreme Court has indicated that “[t]he nondelegation doctrine is
rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite
system of Government.” 363 Because the Constitution’s legislative vesting
clause requires that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
358. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379 (1989).
359. See, e.g., 73 Fed. Reg. 39857-01, 39857 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 301; 25 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13,
200).
360. See Tillett v. Lujan, 931 F.2d 636, 641 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he rule establishing a
CFR court . . . is rational, based on a consideration of the relevant factors [of urgent need for
the court], and within the scope of authority delegated to the BIA by [25 U.S.C. § 2].”).
361. Compare Org. Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 63 (1962) (holding that
regulatory jurisdiction conveyed by § 2, “[i]n keeping with the policy of almost total tribal
self-government prevailing when th[is] statute[] was passed . . . is that to implement specific
laws . . . not a general power to make rules governing Indian conduct”) with Udall v. Littell,
366 F.2d 668, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (“In charging the Secretary with broad responsibility for
the welfare of Indian tribes [pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 2], Congress must be assumed to have
given him reasonable powers to discharge it effectively.”).
362. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372-73 (deeming statutory delegations to administrative
agencies “constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the
public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority”) (quoting
American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946)). But see Robinson v.
Salazar, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1037 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (“This Court does not find that [25
U.S.C. § 2’s] delegation to the DOI to determine tribal recognition violates the nondelegation doctrine. . . . [G]eneralized legal authorities are inapplicable in light of the vast
statutory authority before this Court and including centuries of history and judicial opinions
adjudicating and upholding the DOI regulations.”).
363. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol40/iss1/5

No. 1]

COMMENTS

185

in a Congress of the United States,” 364 the general rule is that Congress may
not transfer its legislative authority to the executive or judiciary. 365
In addition to its constitutional underpinnings, the nondelegation
doctrine is guided by three central policy considerations:
First, and most abstractly, it ensures to the extent consistent with
orderly governmental administration that important choices of
social policy are made by Congress, the branch of our
Government most responsive to the popular will. . . . Second, the
doctrine guarantees that, to the extent Congress finds it
necessary to delegate authority, it provides the recipient of that
authority with an ‘intelligible principle’ to guide the exercise of
the delegated discretion. . . . Third, and derivative of the second,
the doctrine ensures that courts charged with reviewing the
exercise of delegated legislative discretion will be able to test
that exercise against ascertainable standards. 366
The Supreme Court has, however, ruled that “the extent and character of
that assistance [of another branch] must be fixed according to common
sense and the inherent necessities of the government co-ordination.” 367 The
general rule barring legislative delegation yields, in particular, where
Congress articulates an “intelligible principle to which the person or body
authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform.” 368
The Court has obliquely defined an “intelligible principle” as an articulation
of “the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the
boundaries of this delegated authority.” 369 An intelligible principle,
however, need not be stated with exacting precision. 370
The animating policy considerations for the intelligible principle, as an
exception to the general rule of the nondelegation doctrine, include
recognition that “in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever
364. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
365. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371-72.
366. Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-86
(1980) (citations omitted).
367. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394, 406 (1928)).
368. Id. (quoting J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409).
369. Id. at 372-73 (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946));
see also id. at 379 (calling also for “what the [agency] should do and how it should do it, and
set[ting] out specific directives to govern particular situations”) (quoting United States v.
Chambless, 680 F. Supp. 793, 796 (E.D. La. 1988)).
370. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (citation omitted).
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changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.” 371
These policy considerations have been so strong that the Supreme Court, at
least through 2015, had struck only two statutes under the nondelegation
doctrine—both strikings occurring in 1935. 372 Indeed, as one scholar has
stated, “claims that statutes violate the nondelegation doctrine never
prevail.” 373 Courts have suggested, however, that strong functionalist
policies militating against strict application of the nondelegation doctrine 374
weaken with substantively broad delegations. 375
Without the benefit of additional data and empirical research, it is
difficult to suggest a precise intelligible principle Congress could articulate.
Fortunately, in American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, the Supreme Court
implicitly recognized this quandary of prospective intelligible principle
drafting and allowed the articulation of relatively broad intelligible
371. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372.
372. See generally A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 54142 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935); see also Mistretta, 488 U.S.
at 416; United States v. Scully, No. 14-CR-208 ADS SIL, 2015 WL 3540466, at *53
(E.D.N.Y. June 8, 2015) (“[O]nly twice in the Supreme Court's history . . . has it invalidated
a statute on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative authority.”); Matthew R.
Bowles, Speak Now or Be Forever Overruled: Deferring to Political ‘Judgment’ in EPA
Rulemakings, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 591, 598 (2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court has
consistently recognized the constitutionality of the administrative state, affirming countless
delegations of legislative authority.”); PIERCE, supra note 352, § 2.6 (“Except for two 1935
cases, the Court has never enforced its frequently announced prohibition on congressional
delegation of legislative power”).
373. PIERCE, supra note 352, § 2.6; see also id. (indicating that circuit court as well as
Supreme Court decisions “regularly uphold broad delegations of power”).
374. See id. (indicating that Supreme Court justices, since 1989, have largely abandoned
the nondelegation doctrine owing to “the extreme difficulty of creating a justiciable
standard,” their “adopt[ion of] a more realistic perspective on the legislative process,” and
their “recogni[tion] that agencies are politically accountable”).
375. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (“[T]he degree of
agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to the scope of the power
congressionally conferred.”); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 n. 7 (“In recent years, our
application of the nondelegation doctrine principally has been limited to . . . giving narrow
constructions to statutory delegations that might otherwise be thought to be
unconstitutional.”) (emphasis added); see also PIERCE, supra note 352, § 2.6 (indicating that
some jurisdictions use the nondelegation doctrine to narrowly interpret delegated authority
of “extraordinary breadth,” viewing such breadth as a “conflict with a constitutional limit on
governmental power”); id. (“Even though claims that statutes violate the nondelegation
doctrine never prevail, they sometimes can improve a petitioner’s prospects of prevailing
against an agency on other grounds.”).
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principles in response to “the necessities of modern legislation dealing with
complex economic and social problems.” 376
That case’s procedural history began with an administrative adjudication,
where the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) found that two
subholding companies, part of a holding company system, had violated
section 11(b)(2) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. 377 The
subholding companies appealed, alleging that the standards articulated in
the act—“unduly or unnecessarily complicat[ing] the structure . . . of [a]
holding-company system” and “unfairly or inequitably distribut[ing] voting
power among security holders . . . of such holding-company system”—were
“legally meaningless” and left the SEC with “unfettered discretion,” thus
violating the nondelegation doctrine. 378
Upon Supreme Court review, however, the Court found no violation of
the nondelegation doctrine. 379 The Court held the standards did have
meaning—“[e]ven standing alone”—although such intelligible principles
“need not be tested in isolation.” 380 Rather, they “derive much meaningful
content from the purpose of the Act, its factual background and the
statutory context in which they appear.”381 In evaluating these
supplementary materials—pointing specifically to codified policy concerns,
as well as standards and “inquiries” in neighboring statutes—the Court
found “a veritable code of rules . . . for the Commission to follow in giving
effect to the standards of § 11(b)(2).” 382
The Court reasoned that “[t]he legislative process would frequently bog
down if Congress were constitutionally required to appraise before-hand the
myriad situations to which it wishes a particular policy to be applied and to
formulate specific rules for each situation.” 383 Upon approaching the “point
beyond which it is unreasonable and impracticable to compel Congress to
prescribe detailed rules . . . it then becomes constitutionally sufficient if
Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is
to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority.” 384

376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

329 U.S. at 104-05.
Id. at 95-96.
See id. at 96-97, 104 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b)(2) (2000) (repealed 2005)).
Id. at 104.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 105.
Id.
Id.
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In view of the close administrative analog of American Power & Light
Co., also addressing “complex economic and social problems,” Congress
should emulate this model to focus on articulating “the general policy” of
support for tribal sovereignty and economies and the BIA’s “boundaries
of . . . delegated authority.” 385 Congress has already articulated much of the
economic and sovereignty policies, 386 which it could easily reorganize or
incorporate by reference, though it would help for Congress to articulate
additional guidance on how it would prefer the BIA to balance these
competing goals. Furthermore, in articulating boundaries of scope and
degree, Congress should mirror the previously approved statutory language
of American Power & Light.
2. Congress Should Confer to the Bureau Only Formal Rulemaking
Authority with Respect to Tribal Civil Jurisdiction in Tribal Courts
The heightened importance of issues of tribal sovereignty 387 demands
that Congress (and the BIA) act conservatively and carefully in modifying
the statutory and regulatory scheme surrounding tribal civil jurisdiction.
Therefore, Congress should not transfer to the Bureau of Indian Affairs any
adjudicatory authority over tribal civil jurisdiction, as this would only add
an extra competing forum to an already confusing mix, producing
additional cost and delay without any accompanying benefit. 388 Among the
most conservative responses Congress can feasibly pursue would be to
delegate to the BIA only formal rulemaking authority over the narrow
realm of tribal civil jurisdiction so as to preserve for soon-to-be regulated
tribes the maximum procedural protections available under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 389
Although formal rulemaking fell out of judicial favor with United States
v. Florida East Coast Railway, 390 formal rulemaking also has “powerful
benefits . . . including the potential to uproot an agency’s faulty
385. Id.
386. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451, 3601, 3652, 4301 (2012).
387. See Nakai, supra note 151, at 685 (“Traditionally, tribes view any efforts to limit
their jurisdiction as a blow to sovereignty . . . .”).
388. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94-95 (2009) (requiring that jurisdictional
rules be based on policies valuing “predictability,” cost savings and expedience,
“administrative simplicity,” and an avoidance of “greater litigation” and “strange results”).
389. See Aaron L. Nielson, In Defense of Formal Rulemaking, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 237, 254
(2014) (“The intuition behind formal rulemaking, however—the notion that informal
rulemaking’s truncated procedures are sometimes not enough—has never gone away.”).
390. 410 U.S. 224 (1973); see also Nielson, supra note 389, at 251 (“This decision . . .
profoundly undercut formal rulemaking . . . .”).
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assumptions and increase the public’s confidence in the regulatory
process.” 391 Although Florida East Coast Railway may have rendered the
once more liberally applied formal rulemaking practically “obsolete,” the
American Bar Association’s Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory
Practice has indicated formal rulemaking’s enhanced procedural protections
remain beneficial in “proceedings of unusual complexity or with a potential
for significant economic impact”—both of which apply to inquiries of tribal
civil jurisdiction over non-members. 392
Governed by 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557, formal rulemaking calls for “hearing
officers, pre-trial conferences, burdens, proposed findings, and crossexamination, plus . . . a bar on . . . ex parte communications.” 393 All of these
protections would ensure that the various tribes and other parties affected
will have the best opportunity to orally present evidence before the BIA to
indicate their concerns regarding any regulations’ effects on tribal
sovereignty or economics while also ensuring a more accurate and
transparent response from the agency. 394
Despite the judicial “gutt[ing]” of formal rulemaking in Florida East
Coast Railway, the Court continues to require agencies to comply with the
APA’s formal rulemaking procedures where an enabling statute employs
“text quite close to the magic words, ‘on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing.’” 395 At issue in that case, section 1(14)(a) of the Interstate
Commerce Act required the Interstate Commerce Commission to perform
rulemaking merely “after hearing.” 396 The Court held that “after hearing”
was not synonymous with the formal rulemaking triggering language of §
553(c): “on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.” 397 The
Supreme Court reasoned that this triggering language was articulated by
Congress, and even though few existing statutes parroted equivalent
language so as to trigger formal rulemaking, the fact that some statutes did
meant “adherence to that language cannot be said to render the provision
391. Nielson, supra note 389, at 292.
392. Id. at 257 (quoting Comments on H.R. 3010, The Regulatory Accountability Act of
2011, ABA SEC. OF ADMIN. LAW & REG. PRAC. (2011), 21, http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/administrative_law/commentson3010_final_nocover.authchec
kdam.pdf).
393. Id. at 239.
394. See id. at 241.
395. Id. at 240, 253 (quoting Michael P. Healy, Florida East Coast Railway and the
Structure of Administrative Law, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 1039, 1039 (2006)).
396. United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 236 (1973) (quoting 49 U.S.C.
§ 1(14)(a) (repealed 1978)).
397. Id. at 234 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1(14)(a) (repealed 1978); 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)).
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nugatory or ineffectual.” 398 As such, the Court held that absent formal
rulemaking’s triggering language, mere “‘hearings’ often need only be the
submission of written comments.” 399
Simply empowering tribes to submit comments, however, likely offers
insufficient procedural protection for those who would be impacted by BIA
regulation of tribal civil jurisdiction. Recognizing the strong federal policy
of “tribal self-government and self-determination,” 400 tribal civil
jurisdiction should not be casually modified—even to support, in this
instance, the competing interest of tribal economic development. Rather,
tribes deserve an opportunity to receive the oral, trial-like procedures of
formal rulemaking 401 to articulate their concerns and goals.
The extra procedural protections of formal rulemaking, unfortunately,
are likely to inject delay into the rulemaking process. 402 This delay,
however, is likely to offer “pro-democracy benefits” that would be
especially valuable in the “controversial” domain of balancing tribal
sovereignty with tribal economic development. 403 As Professor Aaron
Nielson has explained, though “delay is frustrating to those who want
immediate action, the [rulemaking] process cannot be short circuited if it is
to retain its legitimacy.” 404
Therefore, Congress should capture formal rulemaking’s benefits of
accuracy, transparency, and legitimacy by drafting the BIA’s new enabling
statute—enabling regulation of tribal civil jurisdiction—so as to include the
Florida East Coast Railway language that triggers formal rulemaking. 405
3. Suggested Goals Under the Modified Regulatory Framework
Although there is a need for much additional research before drafting a
comprehensive response to the problem, Congress should follow Justice
Souter’s recommendations from Nevada v. Hicks. Justice Souter argued for
eliminating land as a primary jurisdictional fact to prevent creating “an
unstable jurisdictional crazy quilt” stemming from the fact that “land on
Indian reservations constantly changes hands.” 406 Such an effect is
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.

Id. at 224, 237-38.
Nielson, supra note 389, at 252.
Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985).
See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (2012).
See Nielson, supra note 389, at 282.
Id. at 282-83.
Id. at 283.
See generally United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 383 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring).
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problematic, Justice Souter explains, because a jurisdictional rule relying
primarily on land status “would prove extraordinarily difficult to administer
and would provide little notice to nonmembers.” 407
While Justice Souter’s land suggestion will certainly help with
improving predictability in the canon of tribal civil jurisdiction, the BIA
should also research the costs and benefits of further reducing the number
of factors in the analysis. Thus, in addition to targeting the factor of land
ownership for elimination, the BIA should also consider eliminating
parties’ tribal affiliations—a sort of race proxy—from the formula to
prevent discriminatory effects. Although this will certainly have effects on
tribal sovereignty, further research should identify a narrowly tailored
solution that balances tribal sovereignty, tribal economic development, and
reduced transactional discrimination.
Reducing inherent tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction to the reservation
borders—with no consideration of land ownership or tribal membership—
and providing for minimum contacts analysis 408 and long-arm statutes, 409
much like in federal and state forums today, may be an effective way to
inject additional certainty into the jurisdictional analysis. However, further
research should closely consider how these suggestions would impact tribal
economies and self-governance.
V. Conclusion
The labyrinthine doctrine of tribal civil jurisdiction is more than
frustrating; it is impeding the development of tribal economies. This is a
complex problem, and the best solution is likely to require some form of
rebalancing the competing policies of tribal sovereignty and tribal
economics. That task should be delegated to the Bureau of Indian Affairs to
put administrative law to work in the arena in which it is most effective—
that of complex problems. In providing for formal rulemaking, this
administrative solution is designed to give all parties a voice in the process,
consider all competing interests and, hopefully, achieve a net benefit for all
parties involved.

407. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
408. See generally 28 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 65:10 (Westlaw) (updated Dec. 2015)
(providing thorough coverage of the minimum contacts doctrine).
409. See generally Nakai, supra note 151.
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